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Summary 
The European Union has for a long time sought to shape itself as an environmental leader and 
role model. Over time, this pursuit has allowed the EU to develop sophisticated competences 
in environmental law and external action. Using this expertise the EU has undertaken an 
ambitious climate change policy with international aspirations.  As the defining feature of its 
climate change programme the EU is pioneering the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme is a market-based means of addressing 
increasing emissions and is intended to define the EU’s leadership as progressive and 
innovative. An important element of the scheme is the successive expansion of its coverage to 
new sectors of economic activity. As part of this process, Directive 2008/101 (‘Aviation 
Directive’), provides for the inclusion of civil aviation in the Emissions Trading Scheme 
starting in 2012. The inclusion of foreign as well as domestic airlines in the scheme resulted 
in aggressive international efforts to derail the extension, as well as a legal challenge that 
eventually emerged before the Court of Justice of the European Union in the form of the Air 
Transport Association of America preliminary reference. Against this background, this thesis 
seeks to analyse the judiciary’s interpretation of the EU’s climate change policies on the basis 
of its environmental competences. More specifically, it strives to evaluate the impact of the 
Court’s interpretation in the Air Transport Association of America case on the EU’s claim to, 
and merits as, an environmental leader.  
This thesis concludes firstly, that the EU is in a unique position to assume the role of 
environmental leader; it has the competence as well as the constitutional restrictions 
necessary to succeed in this role, to achieve its objectives, and to eventually lead the 
international community toward a multilateral solution to man-made climate change. 
Secondly, that while the EU possesses the relevant competence, it is currently selling itself 
short in its exercise of that competence. The Aviation Directive is an outstanding example of 
the EU’s ability to play the game of international politics in a measured and constructive 
manner. Yet the Air Transport Association of America case, together with the EU’s political 
behaviour in its aftermath, has revealed a hesitance to make the hard choices and to assume 
the responsibilities attached to leadership. If the EU is to be a role model and a credible 
leader, it must play to the strengths of its position and be unapologetic in its pursuit of a 
progressive and sustainable global climate change policy. And in turn, as the supreme court 
of the EU, the Court of Justice is responsible for interpreting European Union law in a 
consistent and predictable manner reconciling its progressive and fundamental qualities with 
the requirements and constraints of international law, the rule of law and the separation of 
powers. It is argued in this thesis that despite the Court’s generally excellent track record in 
this regard, its judgment in Air Transport Association of America constitutes a failure to 
reproduce the quality jurisprudence that the Court is famous for. For the moment, it is clear 
that the EU’s political leadership in environmental matters is suffering from several setbacks, 
amongst them the international reaction to the Aviation Directive. Only time will reveal what 
lasting impact the Court’s approach to the Aviation Directive will have on the EU’s 
environmental leadership ambitions. 
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Speaking of longer winters and warmer summers, let us move on to the environment; 
 
 
 
 
“The planet doesn’t need saving – the planet will be just fine. It’s the people that are 
screwed.”1 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                   
1 A paraphrased extract from George Carlin’s stand-up comedy, ‘Jammin’ in New York’, (24 April 1992), at 
circa 2:30 minutes. 
3 
 
Abbreviations 
ATAA Air Transport Association of America 
ATA Air Transport Association (of America) 
CBDR Common but differentiated responsibilities 
CFREU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
CICA Convention on International Civil Aviation  
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
EEP Energy Efficiency Policy 
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TEU Treaty on European Union 
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1 Introduction 
A. International climate change policy and leadership 
The greatest challenge to face humanity in modern times is one that mankind is ultimately 
responsible for causing as well as solving. The problem of anthropogenic climate change is 
today well known and well documented 2 . Our understanding of the causes behind this 
phenomenon is constantly evolving, as is our appreciation of the magnitude of its effects. 
What yet eludes us is an enduring and comprehensive solution 3 . The reasons for this 
elusiveness are numerous and range from lack of political will, economic resources and 
know-how to mistrust of the underlying science and the inability to agree on an international 
framework for tackling the threat of global warming. The culprit behind the socio-political 
stalemate dominating international environmental negotiations is the special characteristic of 
the climate change equation whereby countless local sources of pollution contribute to a 
single, global, climate-altering effect. This characteristic propagates into all levels of 
discourse. From an economic perspective, this complicates the quantification and distribution 
of the costs of remediation4. From a political standpoint, advocating unilateral action to raise 
environmental protection standards becomes a hard sell, especially where new measures are 
not reciprocated by counterparties5. The jurisprudential and ethical task of attributing blame 
and responsibility for pollution in order to pave the way for new agreements is rendered a 
practical impossibility in light of the historical distribution of economic and political might 
and the absence of similar environmental considerations from the global agenda at the time6. 
At its heart, the problem plaguing environmental protection is the same as with any public 
good. This is to say that environmental action is dis-incentivised as a ‘free rider’ is able to 
take part of any benefits resulting from action by others without having to share in the costs7.  
On the level of the nation-state, the problem of the free rider is solved through the institution 
of government, which is responsible for the provision of public goods, financed by way of 
tax-contributions from those partaking in the society8. The provision of public goods on the 
level of the international society is stymied by a patent lack of such an authority9. Although 
the institutional infrastructure of the United Nations performs an important coordinating task, 
it has neither the legislative mandate nor the enforcement-based authority possessed by 
sovereign governments. As a result there are no settled rules or procedures for dealing with 
developments of a public-good nature, resulting in an inability to effectively deal with the 
                                                   
2 Solomon  S. et al. (Eds.), 'Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change' (2007: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). 
3 Sterk W. et al. ‘Deadlocks of International Climate Policy – An Assessment of the Copenhagen Climate 
Summit’ (2010) Journal for European Environmental & Planning Law 7:2, 201, at 217.  
4 Morris D., ‘Who should pay climate change costs?’ (21 January 2013). Available at: 
http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/who-should-pay-climate-change-costs/. Accessed 21 March 2013. 
5 See for instance Tingley D. and Tomz M., ‘Conditional Cooperation and Climate Change’ (2014) Comparative 
Political Studies, 1, at 2f.  
6 Rajamani L., ‘The Increasing Currency and Relevance of Rights-Based perspectives in the International 
Negotiations on Climate Change’ (2010) Journal of Environmental Law 22:3, 391, at 421. See also McManus 
K., ‘The principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ and the UNFCCC’ (2009) Climatico Special 
Features, 2, at 3. Available at: http://www.climaticoanalysis.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/12/kmcmanus_common-responsibilities.pdf. Accessed 21 March 2013.  
7 See for instance Coase R.H., ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 JL Econ 1. 
8 See for instance Groves T. and Ledyard J., ‘Optimal allocation of public goods: A solution to the ‘free rider’ 
problem’ (1977) Journal of the Econometric Society 45:4, 783.  
9 Tingley (2014), supra note 5, at 2. 
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problem of the free rider. In an ideal scenario, an inclusive and multilateral framework for 
environmental protection would be adopted as part of, or successor to, the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 10 . Such an agreement would necessarily differ from the 
UNFCCC in that it would contain a core of legal obligations subject to effective enforcement 
overseen by a central body11. This framework would focus on climate change and balance 
broadly agreeable terms and economic incentives for participation with significant sanctions 
for non-participation or failure to meet obligations. In order to ensure the success of the 
agreement, environmental obligations should be implemented horizontally across other areas 
of cooperation such as trade and development aid while respecting the comparative capacities 
of the states involved12. This ideal would thus consist of an international framework that sets 
minimum standards and encourages progressive improvements to environmental protection 
on the part of states so as to eliminate free-riders and incentivize first movers13.  
Alas, such a solution remains illusory due to the reality of international environmental 
politics. The parties to the UNFCCC have largely failed in their task to devise a successor to 
the Kyoto Protocol that would enter into force upon the expiration of the second Kyoto 
commitment period in 202014. This stalemate can partly be blamed on the current economic 
climate, which has seen environmental concerns overtaken by other priorities 15 . While 
environmental action remains a top priority for many international actors16, the divergence in 
priorities nonetheless presents difficulties in pursuing consensus on the shape of a future 
agreement on environmental protection. What some see as the natural progression of 
negotiations on controversial matters such as climate change action17, others see as evidence 
of international institutional failure and proof of multilateral unwillingness to act18. As a 
result, international action on environmental protection is increasingly taking place at bi-
lateral, regional and even unilateral level 19 , as observed in the increase of bi-lateral 
environmental agreements as well as the inclusion of environmental obligations in non-
environmental agreements20. The increasing dispersion of environmental initiative has an 
                                                   
10 Kulovesi K., 'Addressing Sectoral Emissions outside the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change: What Roles for Multilateralism, Minilateralism and Unilateralism?' (2012) Review of European 
Community & International Environmental Law 21:3, 193, at 193. Also French D., 'Finding Autonomy in 
International Environmental Law and Governance' (2009) Journal of Environmental Law 21:2, 255, at 264. 
11 French (2009), supra note 10, at 259.  
12 Thus recognising for instance the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities; Article 3 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1917 UNTS 107, discussed further below. 
13 Hertogen A., ‘Sovereignty as Decisional Independence over Domestic Affairs: The Dispute over Aviation in 
the EU Emissions Trading System’ (2012) Transnational Environmental Law 2:1, 281, at 283 and 300f.  
14 W Sterk et al (2010), supra note 3.    
15 See Report of the High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence in the areas of development, 
humanitarian assistance and the environment ‘Delivering as one’ (2006) A/61/583, in Fajardo del Castillo T., 
‘Revisiting the External Dimension of the Environmental Policy of the European Union: Some Challenges 
Ahead’ (2010) Journal for European Environmental Planning Law 7:4, 365, at 377. 
16 Stern N., ‘The tide could be finally turning on climate change action’ (25 January 2013). Available at: 
blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2013/01/25/the-tide-could-be-finally-turning-on-climate-change-
action/?#axzz2J00He0uL. Accessed 21 March 2013. 
17 For instance those parties advocating the ICAO as the only avenue for a solution on aviation emissions. 
18 The EU has argued that the Aviation Directive is a response to the failure of the ICAO to take action. See 
section 2(A)(ii).  
19 Bogojević S., ‘Legalising Environmental Leadership: A Comment on the CJEU’s Ruling in C-366/10 on the 
Inclusion of Aviation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’ (2012) Journal of Environmental Law 24:2, 345, at 
356. See also Kulovesi (2012), supra note 10, at 194 for a treatment of these concepts. 
20 Quirico O., ‘Disentangling Climate Change Governance: A Legal Perspective’ (2012) Review of European 
Community & International Environmental Law 21:2, 92, at 96. Durán G.M. and Morgera E., Environmental 
Integration in the EU’s External Relations – Beyond Multilateral Dimensions (2012: Hart Publishing Ltd, 
Oxford), at 2.  
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impact on the balance of negotiating power in as far as it circumvents the voting requirements 
of the United Nations General Assembly. As a result, powerful regional blocs – enabled by 
their economic strength – are assuming the role of international environmental watchdog by 
their own fiat. There is a palpable leadership vacuum on the international stage that several 
regional blocs are now attempting to fill21. This thesis will focus specifically on the EU’s 
claim to environmental leadership22 – a claim advanced on the back of an ambitious climate 
change policy, supported by the unique characteristics that set the EU apart from other would-
be contestants to the title.  
B. Climate change policy and leadership at EU level 
Why, then, is the EU in a position to claim the role of environmental leader? On a policy 
level, the EU has for a long time sought to shape itself as an environmental leader and role 
model23. Over time, this pursuit has allowed the EU to develop sophisticated competences in 
environmental law and external action24. On the basis of this expertise the EU has undertaken 
an ambitious climate change policy with international aspirations25. As the defining feature of 
its climate change programme the EU is pioneering the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme26. The EU ETS is a market-based means of addressing increasing emissions and is 
intended to define the EU’s leadership as progressive and innovative. An important element 
of the scheme is the successive expansion of its coverage to new sectors of economic activity. 
As part of this process, Directive 2008/10127 provides for the inclusion of civil aviation in the 
EU ETS starting in 201228. The inclusion of foreign as well as domestic airlines in the scheme 
resulted in aggressive international efforts to derail the extension, as well as a legal challenge 
that eventually emerged before the CJEU29 in the form of the ATAA preliminary reference30. 
Further, the EU is already recognised as a “norm entrepreneur”31 and a “market player and 
rule generator”32 owing to its considerable economic power. In its current ‘fourth phase’ – 
consisting of the Kyoto Protocol’s post-implementation stage and negotiation of a follow-up 
agreement33 – EU climate change policy has expanded to include the practice of inserting 
environmental protection provisions even into non-environmental international agreements. 
                                                   
21 Most prominently by the US, the EU, and increasingly China. 
22 See for instance Hedegaard C., ‘Statement on the European budget agreement’ (8 February 2013). Available 
at:  http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/hedegaard/headlines/news/2013-02-08_01_en.htm. Accessed 21 
March 2013. 
23 Wurzel R.K.W. and Connelly J., The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics 
(2012: Routledge, Oxon), at 3ff.  
24 See section 2B for an outline of these competences.   
25 Wurzel (2012), supra note 23, at 4f.  
26 European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L 275/32. See 
section 2Ai. 
27 Henceforth the “Aviation Directive”. European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/101/EC amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community [2008] OJ L8/4. 
28 Section 2Aii.  
29 For the sake of simplicity, and unless otherwise specified, ‘CJEU’ will be used to refer to the all instances of 
the Court of the European Union, whether before or after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
30 Case C-366/10 The Air Transport Association of America, American Airlines, Inc., Continental Airlines, Inc., 
United Airlines, Inc. v. The Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2011] OJ C260/9. See section 
4A.   
31 Bogojević (2012), supra note 19, at 355. 
32 Cremona, M., 'The Union as a Global Actor: Roles, Models and Identity' (2004) Common Market Law 
Review 41, 553, 553ff. 
33 Wurzel (2012), supra note 23, at 1.  
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Perhaps most importantly, the EU has shown considerable interest and dedication to the idea 
of environmental protection, even at the height of the economic crisis. Regardless of its other 
qualities, it is the EU’s willingness – at all levels of society34 – to face the climate change 
challenge and to assume the responsibilities of leadership that places the EU in a league of its 
own. Evidence of this willingness in terms of environmental protection and the pursuit of a 
global accord can be found from the preamble to the EU Treaties35 and all the way to the top 
of the EU’s political leadership.  Jose Manuel Barroso, president of the European 
Commission has stated that “[r]esponding to the challenge of climate change is the ultimate 
political test for our generation”36.  
Finally, the institutional make-up of the EU sets it apart from sovereign actors as well as other 
supra-national organisations. This thesis will argue that much can be gained from the EU’s 
compromise-imbued approach to politics37, especially in a dispute-riddled field like climate 
change action. The Court of Justice of the European Union in particular symbolises the EU’s 
unique standing as an international actor. The Court’s considerable contribution to the EU’s 
legal legacy represents a remarkable interpretation of the role of a ‘national’ constitutional 
court in approaching the nexus between national and international law. As a legislatively 
active court, the CJEU has also gained many critics both within and outside the EU. Yet this 
very role together with the Court’s connection to the European Court of Human Rights 
(through its jurisprudence and now, the Lisbon Treaty), mark it as an influential source of 
law. In light of this central function, this thesis will examine the role of the Court and the role 
of judicial interpretation in the context of the EU’s leadership on climate change action, using 
the ATAA case as the primary point of reference. 
C. Research Questions 
The underlying question and theme of this thesis is whether the CJEU through its ruling in 
ATAA complicated, if not endangered, the EU’s environmental leadership ambitions. In order 
to set the context for answering this primary question, the thesis will first consider the 
substantive policies and legal competences of the EU’s environmental leadership, asking 
whether the two are consistent. It will then deliberate over the role of the judiciary in 
interpreting EU policy. The author will address two questions in this regard: what role has the 
CJEU set out for itself within the EU legal and policy framework? And how is the CJEU 
intended to wield its interpretative powers when faced with conflicting provisions of EU and 
international law? Having set the context, this thesis will review the response of the CJEU to 
the ATA’s challenge to the Aviation Directive – note that I seek to use the non-italized 
acronym ‘ATA’ to distinguish the ATA organisation from the ATAA case. With regard to the 
judgment in that case, did the Court succeed in fulfilling its role as outlined? Further, could 
the Court have chosen and phrased its arguments in more constructive terms, more consistent 
with its role and with EU law and policy? Finally this thesis asks: has the Court’s treatment of 
the ATAA case has harmed the EU’s long-term environmental leadership ambitions? 
                                                   
34 European Commission, Eurobarometer, ‘Attitudes of European Citizens Towards the Environment’ (2008) 
Brussels. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_295_en.pdf. Accessed 21 March 
2013. 
35 Treaty on European Union (Consolidated version) [2010] OJ C83/13. The preamble includes the provision: 
“DETERMINED to promote economic and social progress for their peoples, taking into account the principle of 
sustainable development and within the context of the accomplishment of the internal market and of reinforced 
cohesion and environmental protection, and to implement policies ensuring that advances in economic 
integration are accompanied by parallel progress in other fields”. 
36 European Commission, ‘Boosting Growth and Jobs by Meeting Our Climate Change Commitments’ 
(23.1.2008) Press Release IP/08/80, Brussels. 
37 Wurzel (2012), supra note 23, at 9. 
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D. Structure and methodology 
This thesis begins by setting out the context for the debate to follow. The first section (2Ai) of 
Chapter II covers the substantive tools of the EU’s climate change policy – the EU ETS and 
the Aviation Directive. The second section (2Aii) sets out the legal context for these policies 
by outlining the competences found in the Treaties (2B). To do this, the second chapter 
applies the standard legal method of analysis where the environmental competence of the EU 
is quantified on the basis of EU primary law, secondary law and CJEU jurisprudence. The 
policy-analysis is based on the academic literature on the subject, statements made by the EU 
institutions, on media coverage as well as an interview with a representative at the European 
Environment Agency. Through the above, Chapter II aims to give a broad picture of the EU’s 
environmental competence and climate change policy. The intention is to provide an adequate 
foundation for the following discussion on the CJEU and its interpretation of the Aviation 
Directive in light of the arguments in the ATAA case. 
Chapter III offers some speculative commentary on the socio-political role of a supreme court 
in a democratic state (or union) where the principles of the rule of law and the separation of 
powers must be treasured (3A). This commentary is necessitated by the nature of the 
argument in this thesis, and is intended only as a lose justification for advancing the argument 
in Chapter IV that the Court perhaps ‘should’ have chosen a particular interpretation over 
another. Following from this, a short review of some of the most notable (and progressive) 
judgments of the CJEU will be undertaken (3B), aimed at supporting this author’s standpoint 
with regard to the Court – that the CJEU stands for an exemplary judicial legacy, 
characterised by cogent and constructive judicial reasoning that has stood in harmony with 
the wider EU’s aspirations to safeguard stable, progressive and democratic ideologies based 
on a set of rights and freedoms that are fundamental to the EU. Finally, a short review of the 
Court’s environmental legacy will be undertaken, drawing a parallel to the development of 
another fundamental area of EU law – human rights and fundamental freedoms. The cases are 
chosen for their relevance to the arguments advanced in Chapter IV.  
With the context in place, the sum of the above interactions is analysed in Chapter IV. The 
first section examines the preliminary reference, Advocate General’s Opinion and the 
judgment in the ATAA case (4A). The following section evaluates the climactic events 
surrounding the case, and comments on some of the concerns raised because of the non-
judicial fallout in the aftermath, with the intention of establishing a connection between the 
judgment of the CJEU in ATAA and the EU’s wider environmental leadership aspirations 
(4B). The third section goes on to deal with the specific issues raised as part of that 
connection. With a mind to the academic discourse spawned by the ATAA case, this thesis 
will evaluate and propose alternative avenues of judicial interpretation that could meet the 
EU’s policy objectives in a manner consistent with its own legal competence as well as its 
capacity to act as a matter of international law (4C).  
E. Delimitations 
As one of the themes of this thesis is EU environmental leadership, much attention is paid to 
the EU’s flagship environmental project – its climate change policy. As a result, treatment of 
other major fields of environmental policy such as sustainable development, development 
assistance and trade-related matters is omitted in Chapter II. Moreover, due to the use of the 
ATAA case as an illustrative example of the Court’s interpretation of the EU law and policy, 
discussion within EU climate change policy is limited to the EU ETS. This limitation has a 
spillover on the competence section in Chapter II, as reference to certain environmental 
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provisions found in the Treaties will be omitted for their lack of relevance in terms of the ETS 
in specific. With regard to Chapter III, the choice of case law for the review of the Court’s 
jurisprudence is intentionally limited to the most formative cases. Moreover it is conceded 
that the choice of case law is intended to depict the Court’s most progressive, and in this 
author’s opinion, most constructive disposition. Admittedly, this entails that conflicting case 
law is excluded in this section. However, the purpose of the review is not necessarily to show 
that the Court exclusively exercises a certain type of interpretation, but rather that at very 
least the Court is capable of such interpretation. Further, while the thesis discusses the 
internal competence of the EU in environmental matters, the bulk of the discussion in Chapter 
IV concerns the Court’s interpretation of the external dimension of the EU’s climate change 
policy. As such the author has not felt that a detailed discussion of horizontal integration 
under the integration requirement is necessary. For the same reason, analysis of the exact 
division of competences between member states and the EU is largely omitted.  
On the one hand this thesis does not seek to establish whether the dispersion of multilateral 
environmental policy to sub-global levels, as mentioned above, is to be seen as positive or 
negative. On the other hand, and to a certain extent, it does explore the potential for this 
development to “advance the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC to prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic climate change” 38 , whether directly or indirectly. It thus eschews any 
conclusions on the merits of a regional approach, choosing instead to focus on the particular 
instance of the EU’s ambitions to international environmental leadership by setting a regional 
example for others to follow. 
It is the general theme of this thesis to explore and assess the substance and consistency of the 
EU’s environmental leadership, while its specific focus is the competence and climate change 
policy of the EU in light of the regulation of emissions from aviation. As such, the intention is 
not to define specific parameters within the concept of ‘leadership’ and restrict the analysis 
according to these, as this risks detracting from the intended focus on environmental 
competence and climate change policy. To put it plainly: this thesis adopts an open and 
inclusive approach to the concept of leadership, intentionally avoiding semantic distinctions 
and surrendering instead to the term as used in the common parlance. Having said that, this 
thesis will draw on Wurzel and Connelly’s table of ‘types and styles of leadership’39 where 
helpful and appropriate, in order to support or structure the discussion as to the EU’s 
leadership.  
The ‘types’ of leadership they identify are: structural leadership is a function of ‘hard power’ 
and depends on material resources and economic power. Entrepreneurial leadership consists 
of diplomatic power in the form of negotiating and bargaining prowess as well as the ability 
to facilitate agreements. Cognitive leadership is idea-driven, whereby new areas of action are 
defined and new approaches to existing issues allow different solutions to arise. Symbolic 
leadership entails gesturing and grand promises that are not necessarily followed up by 
corresponding action, or where impetus peters out before policies are fully implemented. The 
‘styles’ of leadership identified by Wurzel and Connelly distinguish between: 
‘transformational’ and ‘transactional’ leadership – a transactional leader implements change 
incrementally, while a transformational leader changes the rules of the game, shifting the 
course of history in the process. Similarly, a ‘heroic’ leader, driven by political willpower and 
characterised by strong, objective-driven action may be contrasted with ‘humdrum’ leader 
making short-term, practicality-driven decisions unburdened by overarching design. 
                                                   
38 Kulovesi (2012), supra note 10, at 195. 
39 Wurzel (2012), supta note 23, at 13.  
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2 The EU’s climate change policy and 
its legal competence 
If the EU is to take charge on the international stage in the fight against climate change, it 
must have a defined and decisive climate change policy underwritten by the competence to 
formulate effective solutions and put these to practice. The first section of this chapter thus 
considers the cornerstone of EU climate change policy, and the second seeks to establish the 
environmental competence of EU subject to Article 5 TEU on the conferral of powers, on the 
basis of EU primary law as determined in the Treaties and the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice. Before examining the EU’s substantive climate change policy, this thesis will offer an 
observation as to the general policy-approach and leadership qualities of the EU in 
international matters.  
At a first glance, the seemingly fractured nature of the EU’s internal leadership and decision-
making process may raise questions as to the suitability of the EU as a global leader 40. 
Indeed, “[t]he fact that ‘Europe has made a principle of powerlessness’ could […] be a 
serious hindrance to the EU’s efforts in offering political leadership in climate change 
politics”41. However, this quality does not necessarily have to be negative. The EU is a 
largely unique type of body in international law, lacking the level of federal authority enjoyed 
by the US government but nonetheless subjecting its member states to a harmonized legal 
system as well as operating a partial monetary (and increasingly, fiscal) union. The 
institutional make-up of the Union also places it apart. The interaction between the Member 
States, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union 42  subjects the EU’s legislative efforts to a wide array of diverging opinions and 
priorities, as clearly demonstrated through the on-going handling of the economic crisis. This 
means that proposals made by the EU are from the outset of a progressive nature and the 
products of a competitive process characterised by compromise43. Through this type of ‘soft 
power’, EU proposals may thusly attract more mainstream interest and support than ‘hard 
power’ proposals carrying a markedly partisan agenda. Both the EU ETS and the Aviation 
Directive contain elements of this type of ‘soft power’ – a good example of the EU’s 
entrepreneurial leadership.  
A. Substantive EU climate change policy 
The EU’s climate change policy, embodied in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme44, is its 
flagship project under the Kyoto Protocol and has received the “Lion’s share” 45 of attention 
in the EU’s “2020” climate and energy strategy46. The first section of this chapter will analyse 
the main features of the EU ETS and the Aviation Directive that extends the scheme to cover 
the aviation sector. The next section will highlight the relevant competences in EU law in 
                                                   
40 Wurzel (2012), supra note 23, at 9. 
41 Wurzel (2012), supra note 23, at 14. 
42 Or the ‘Council of Ministers’, hereinafter referred to as “the Council”. The European Council, comprised of 
the Heads of State, will be referred to as “the European Council”.  
43 Wurzel (2012), supra note 23, at 9.  
44 Wurzel (2012), supra note 23, at 8.  
45 Duran (2012), supra note 20, at 44.   
46 European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/29/EC amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve 
and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community [2009] OJ L 140/63. An 
affirmation of the EU’s leadership ambitions. See Wurzel (2012), supra note 23, at 8. 
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light of the above two instruments so as to provide a foundation for the discussion in Chapter 
IV.  
i. The ‘jewel in the crown’ of EU climate change policy: the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme 
The EU ETS, established under Directive 2003/87/EC47 and substantially revised as part of 
the 2009 climate and energy package48, is the “jewel in the crown” 49 of the EU’s climate 
change policy, establishing a ‘cap-and-trade’ system for high-emission industries with the 
aim of giving companies the flexibility to cut their emissions in the most cost-effective way. 
The EU ETS covers some 45% of European emissions and constitutes the largest market for 
trading emissions allowances in the world, accounting for around three quarters of 
international carbon trading50. The EU ETS has been described by economists from either 
side of the Atlantic as “one of the most exciting and important initiatives ever taken to limit 
the greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change” and as having the potential to 
“provide the cornerstone for an eventual global trading regime”51. Describing the EU ETS, 
one author states that: 
“[t]here are thousands of people involved, including prime ministers and bureaucrats, 
entrepreneurs and inventors seeking to create lower-cost ways of reducing carbon; 
carbon market analysts, broker and bankers mediating and funding markets; CEOs […] 
developing their carbon strategies; engineers in the control room changing the order in 
which electricity generation plants come on-stream; and academics analysing and 
discussing evidence so as to give some intellectual shape to what is happening”52. 
The scope of the EU ETS described here is testament to the magnitude, depth and cross-
disciplinary and -sectoral reach of the project. It is also illustrative of the motives behind the 
EU ETS – to create a modern, market-based mechanism to pave the way for the EU’s 
transition into a “competitive low carbon economy” in the 2050 roadmap53.  
While a ‘cap-and-trade’ mechanism certainly fits with cognitive leadership and market-based 
approach to emission reductions advertised as part of the 2050 roadmap, it was not the first 
proposal for curbing emissions at EU level. In response to a 1990 meeting of the European 
Council calling for the “adoption, at the earliest possible opportunity, of targets and strategies 
for limiting emissions of greenhouse gases, and in particular carbon dioxide […] emissions, 
given their contribution to the greenhouse effect”, the European Commission presented the 
                                                   
47 EU ETS Directive, supra note, 26.  
48 2009 climate and energy package, supra note 46. 
49 Dimas S., ‘Climate Change – International and EU Action’ (31 October 2008) Speech of the EU Environment 
Commissioner at the Climate Change Conference in Prague. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-08-570_en.htm. Accessed 21 March 2013. 
50 European Commission, ‘EU ETS factsheet 2012-13’. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/factsheet_ets_2013_en.pdf. Accessed 21 March 2013. See Anger A. 
and Köhler J., ‘Including aviation emissions in the EU ETS: Much ado about nothing? A review’ (2010) 
Transport Policy 17, 38, at 39.  
51 Ellerman A.D., Convery F.J. and de Perhuis C., Pricing Carbon: The European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (2010: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), at 1.  
52 Ellerman (2010), ibid, at 2. 
53 European Commission, ‘Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, 
The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions: A Roadmap for moving 
to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050’ (8.3.2011) COM 112 final. 
12 
 
European Council with a communication 54  on a Community strategy to achieve said 
reductions, including through the use of fiscal measures. This in turn led to a 1992 proposal 
on the introduction of a carbon tax55. According to Convery, this first Commission proposal 
to reduce emissions to sustainable levels failed mainly due to opposition from two sources56. 
Firstly, those Member States who felt that surrendering any degree of fiscal control to a 
supranational organisation would be a slippery slope to further concessions, and thus 
tantamount to surrendering their sovereignty. Secondly, powerful industrial lobbies, 
represented by the then UNICE (known now as BUSINESSEUROPE57), lobbied against the 
proposal at both Community and Member State level. This opposition resulted in the formal 
withdrawal of the proposal in 1997.  
Following from this, ‘cap-and-trade’ approach to emissions reductions gained wind in the 
post-Kyoto Protocol period, where the EU was face with deciding how it would reach its 
emissions reduction goals. A common goal of 8% below 1990 CO2 emission levels by the 
first Kyoto commitment period was enabled by a burden-sharing agreement reached by the 
European Council58. It was in conjunction with this development that the institution of an 
emissions trading scheme became increasingly feasible. Furthermore it was noted that an ETS 
would give the EU a competitive advantage in the field as it was likely that the United States 
would “embrace emissions trading as a key policy instrument, if and when it addressed 
climate change seriously” 59 . In March 2001 the United States rejected the Protocol, 
magnifying the difficulties involved in the task ahead. This also meant that for it to succeed, 
the EU along with Canada, Japan and Russia had to ratify the Protocol. Convery captures the 
magnitude of this development, stating that: 
“[t]he US decision animated a ‘Save Kyoto’ campaign by the Union and the member 
states, which was in a sense a coming of age. It required the Union to take leadership at 
the various Conferences of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol so as to facilitate 
continuing engagement and support from others, notably Japan and Canada. Russia was 
the final domino that needed to fall […] On October 2004 [the Kyoto Protocol] was 
approved by the Russian parliament, with European Union support for Russian 
membership in the [WTO] as the quid pro quo. Russia’s ratification was a 
demonstration that the Union could be effective at mobilising ‘soft power’ to lead the 
world in shaping climate change policy, and showed the Bush administration that 
progress was possible without US leadership or participation. Throughout this process, 
the EU ETS moved to the centre stage as the core evidence that the [EU] could be 
innovative, courageous and effective in ensuring that its own performance matched its 
rhetoric. […] In other words, Kyoto placed the EU ETS rocked on the launch pad, but it 
was President Bush and his administration that lit the fuse that finally put it into orbit.”60 
                                                   
54 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council’ 
(14.10.1991) SEC(91) 1744 final. 
55 Commission of the European Communities, ’Proposal for a Council Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions and Energy’ (30.6.1992) COM(92) 226 final. 
56 Ellerman (2010), supra note 51, at 16. 
57 BUSINESSEUROPE. Available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/unice.htm. Accessed 21 March 
2013. 
58 Council Decision 2002/358/EC concerning the approval, on behalf of the European Community, of the Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the joint fulfilment of 
commitments thereunder (25.4.2002) OJ L 130. 
59 Ellerman (2010), supra note 51, at 18.  
60 Ellerman (2010), supra note 51, at 18f. 
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The EU ETS is clearly an example of both cognitive and entrepreneurial leadership. 
The EU ETS took effect on 1 January 2005, a month and a half before the Kyoto Protocol 
entered into force. It is clear that the EU ETS holds much potential. It played a significant 
part in the 2009 climate and energy package setting the EU’s 20-20-20 targets: a 20% 
reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels; raising the share of EU energy 
consumption produced from renewable resources to 20% and achieving a 20% improvement 
in the EU’s energy efficiency61. The 2009 package, which has been described by an EEA 
official as “a very strong package”62, introduced significant structural changes to the ETS, 
taking effect at the start of the third trading period in 2013. The changes include moving the 
ETS from ‘national allocation plans’ to an EU-wide cap on allowances, set on a linear target 
path63 that aims to reduce emissions to 21% below 2005 levels by 2020. It also introduces 
annual compliance cycles, with a two-pronged effect: firstly, Member States are granted some 
flexibility in the short run in order to allow them to achieve their goals in the long run. 
Secondly, it gives EU institutions and agencies an improved window of scrutiny, allowing 
them to ensure long-term compliance64. Further, the free allocation of allowances will be 
phased out in stages in favour of auction. Finally, the ETS’s sector coverage will be widened.  
This last change in particular is important for the purpose of this thesis. While an expansion 
of the ETS has been on the table since the scheme’s inception, the current timing is more 
critical than appearances may suggest. Circumstances since the launch of the scheme have 
now brought the ETS to the brink of collapse. The variety of factors involved in a project like 
the ETS was certain to bring with it a great deal of uncertainty, but since the beginning of the 
2007 economic crisis, these have come together in something of a perfect storm. Even at the 
time of the 2009 climate and energy package, the EU was near certain to achieve its 20% 
emissions reduction target. Unfortunately, much of that reduction in emissions is not the 
result (solely) of a successful climate change policy, but the combination of other variables. 
Firstly, a drastic decline in output has followed economic decline. This has naturally had a 
considerable effect on production, and subsequently emissions released by industries across 
the ETS. As a result, companies have been able to meet their emissions reduction 
requirements (as these were calculated against a pre-crisis baseline scenario) without the 
sought-after investment in green technology and without having to resort to the market for 
permits to cover their excess emissions.  
Another factor that has shadowed the development of the ETS since its birth is the well-
established and largely successful energy policy driven by the EU65. Independently of each 
other, a functioning climate change and energy policy are environmental victories for the EU, 
however, the interaction between the two complicates matters66. The success of the EEP, 
which works at a national level, has resulted in lower power requirements across the EU and 
                                                   
61 Climate and Energy Package (2009), supra note 48. See for instance: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm. Last visited 21 March 2013.  
62 Meeting with Andreas Barkman, Head of group for climate mitigation, energy and air pollution at the 
European Environment Agency (6 March 2013).  
63 Bogojević S., ‘The EU ETS Directive Revised: Yet Another Stepping Stone’ (2009) Environmental Law 
Review 11, 279, at 282: “decreasing by a linear factor of 1.74 per cent compared to the average annual total 
quantity issued by Member States in their NAPs for the period 2008 to 2012”. 
64 Meeting with Andreas Barkman, supra note 62. 
65 European Energy Policy or ‘EEP’. 
66 See for instance Weisbach D.A., ‘Carbon Taxation in the EU: Expanding the EU Carbon Price’ (2012) Journal 
of Environmental Law 24:2, 183, at 196ff. Weisbach raises several points of tension, primarily the ability of 
EEP to offset the distribute goals of the ETS, in the Commission’s plan to revise its energy tax system to include 
a carbon tax component.   
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all sectors covered by the ETS. The structural omnipresence of energy efficiency gains further 
lowers the threshold for industry to meet the requirements of the ETS, with the same effects 
as above. On a policy level, tension can be seen between the ETS on the one hand and the 
EEP on the other. While the ETS is still in its infancy due to a long ramp-up period, and its 
measurable effects are uncertain and less pronounced, the EEP is relatively well-established 
and has been producing measurable energy efficiency gains for some time. If the ETS and the 
EEP are not to counteract each other, then the interaction between the EEP and the ETS 
pricing must be predicted and anticipated to great accuracy67. This is one of the aims behind 
the centralization of the EU emissions cap under the 2009 package, which aims to turn “the 
EU emissions market into a secure investment harbour by creating a predictable and stable 
system through harmonisation”68. 
With businesses undershooting their emissions reduction targets without need to resort to the 
predicted investment, two interlinked problems have arisen. Firstly, there is an over-
allocation of unused free allowances69 that companies are able to carry over into the next 
trading period. Secondly, the market mechanism of the ETS has reacted with record-low 
carbon prices. From a starting price of around €30 per tonne of carbon dioxide emitted in 
2005, a record low of €2.81 was hit on 18 January, after a proposal to raise the cost of 
emission was rejected by the European Parliament70. What was supposed to be a “final wake-
up call” for the member states and the Parliament 71  has gone seemingly unheard, as 
Parliament rejected a second plan to boost prices by “backloading” 900 million allowances on 
16 April72. Once again, the price of CO2 emissions under the EU ETS is scraping the bottom. 
The combination of low prices and a massive backlog of free allowances means that the EU 
ETS will not be able to right itself in the short term under its current design. Even when the 
move from ‘grandfathering’ to auctioning of allowances takes place, the backlog will mean 
that the low price on CO2 emissions will persists for some time to come.  
Instead, the EU ETS is being developed in two directions in order to mitigate the above 
effects, which are arguably as least as much creatures of circumstance as of poor design: 
firstly, the EU ETS is being linked to other emissions trading schemes around the world73. 
Secondly, the sectoral coverage of the EU ETS is being expanded. Currently, this has 
included an expansion of the EU ETS to cover the aviation industry through the Aviation 
Directive, and a future expansion is likely to include the shipping industry; subject to global 
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from shipping “moving too slowly”, the EU has 
declared its intention to monitor emissions from shipping starting in 201374 as a first step 
towards bringing emissions from shipping within the EU ETS. Sectoral expansion is of 
course not a new goal. The EU ETS initially applied only to about half of the greenhouse gas 
                                                   
67 Meeting with Andreas Barkman, supra note 62. 
68 Bogojević (2009), supra note 63, at 282. 
69 Bogojević (2009), supra note 63, at 279. 
70 Tromso P.C. et al (24 January 2013) Financial Times. Available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/77764dda-
6645-11e2-b967-00144feab49a.html#axzz2U1Uy6sf9. Accessed 21 March 2013. 
71 Hedegaard C., ’On recent developments in the European Carbon Market’ (24.1.2013). Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-32_en.htm. Accessed 21 March 2013. 
72 McGrath M., ’EU Parliament Rejects Plan to Boost Carbon Trading’ (16 April 2013). Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-22167675. Accessed 21 March 2013. 
73 European Commission, ‘Australia and European Commission agree on pathway towards fully linking 
emissions trading systems’ (28.8.2012). Available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2012082801_en.htm. Accessed 21 March 2013. 
74 Chestney N., ‘EU to monitor shipping emissions from next year’ (1 October 2012). Available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/01/us-shipping-emissions-idUSBRE8900HH20121001. Accessed 21 
March 2013. 
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emissions in Europe 75 , but always included the intention to expand, specifically in the 
transportation sector76. The tension between the sectors covered and those not covered by the 
EU ETS was even raised as a potential breach of the principle of equal treatment in the 
Arcelor77 case. In that case the CJEU recognised that the EU ETS was a ‘novel and complex’ 
scheme, and that an overambitious launch could have endangered the project78, and found the 
infringement justified on the basis that the EU ETS was envisaged as a step-by-step 
approach79. In doing so, the CJEU laid down an implied requirement on the legislature that 
the EU ETS must expand into new sectors.  
In this section, the main features of the EU ETS are outlined to provide the context for the 
EU’s climate change action. It has been established that the EU ETS is still in its starting 
phases and has not been exempt from the pains associated with growth. However, the scheme 
is advancing according to plan, and has now entered the first stage of its expansion phase. As 
a result, the EU’s flagship environmental policy is now faced with a crucial test of maturity; 
will the goals of the first stage of expansion in the aviation sector be achieved, paving the 
way for further expansion, or will the process be stopped in its tracks? To begin answering 
this question, we must turn our attention to the Aviation Directive.  
ii. Leading the charge (on aviation): the Aviation Directive 2008/101 
If the expansion of the EU ETS into multiple new sectors was predetermined from its 
inception, why, then, is the Aviation Directive exceptional as corroborated by its 
contentiousness?  
Firstly, in light of the above discussion, the Aviation Directive gave the EU ETS much 
needed impetus80 at a time when the limits and viability of the scheme are tested81. Secondly, 
the Commission has identified the growth of the airline industry as endangering the broader 
development of the EU ETS if left unchecked; “[i]f the climate change impact of the aviation 
sector continues to grow at the current rate, it would significantly undermine reductions made 
by other sectors to combat climate change”82. Although airline emissions make up a small 
percentage of total emissions (3%) they are growing rapidly (85% growth in emissions from 
1990 to 2004) and will be the major source of carbon dioxide emissions covered by the EU 
ETS by 2020, and certainly by 2050. Moreover, the Aviation Directive is central to the EU’s 
climate change policy as the radiative forcing effect of aviation emissions is higher than that 
                                                   
75 Ellerman A.D., and Buchner B.K., ‘The European Union emissions trading scheme: Origins, allocation, and 
early results’, (2007) Review of Environmental Economics & Policy 1, 66. 
76 Recital 25 and Article 30 of the EU ETS Directive..  
77 Case C-127/07 Arcelor v Premier Ministre [2008] ECR I-9895, see especially paragraph 22.  
78 Arcelor, ibid, paragraphs 60 and 61. 
79 Arcelor, ibid, paragraphs 63.  
80 Bogojević (2012), supra note 19, at 347. 
81 See for Rubini L., and Jegou I., ‘Who’ll Stop the Rain? Allocating Emissions Allowances for Free: 
Environmental Policy, Economics, and WTO subsidy Law’ [2012] Transnational Environmental Law 1:2, 325. 
Manea S., ‘Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions Trading System [2012] 
Transnational Environmental Law 1:2, 303.  Lederer N., ‘The European Emissions Trading Scheme and 
International Emissions Trading – A Comparative Analysis [2008] New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law 
12, 1, at 26ff.  
82 11th Recital to the Aviation Directive. See also Commission of the European Communities, ‘Communication: 
Reducing the Climate Change Impact of Aviation’, COM (27.9.2005) 459 final. See also Anger (2010), supra 
note 50, at 38. See also Kulovesi (2012), supra note 10, at 196. See also Mayer B., ‘Case C-366/10, Air 
Transport Association of America and Others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, with 
annotation by B. Mayer’ (2012) Common Market Law Review 49:3, 1113, at 1117.  
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of other sectors83. Finally, the Aviation Directive is, to date, the clearest test of a sovereign’s 
ability to impose unilateral environmental measures on an international industry 84 : the 
Aviation Directive “will be the first international policy measure with binding targets meant 
to reduce CO2 emissions from aviation” 85 . This perceived application of ‘sovereignty’ 
together with the extra-territorial implications of the Aviation Directive raise important 
questions relating to the compatibility of the Aviation Directive with international law.  
Uncertainty as to the standing of the Aviation Directive starts with the fundamentals of 
multilateral environmental law, that is, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol86. Under the 
UNFCCC, which covers almost all emissions87, there are no binding mitigation targets. Under 
the Kyoto Protocol, which does contain binding targets, the so-called ‘bunker fuels’ including 
aviation and shipping, are subject to a special regime: Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol 
states that Annex I88 parties “shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse 
gases […] from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the ICAO and the IMO 
respectively” 89 . Outside of this commitment, bunker fuels do not count toward Annex I 
parties’ emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol90. What can thus be said is that discussion 
on targets for the aviation sector has come to a standstill under the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol aegis, and the existing requirements on parties, if any, are vague. So the task of 
advancing the multilateral climate change agenda with regard to aviation has increasingly 
fallen upon the ICAO. At its 2010 meeting the ICAO Assembly, the main governing body of 
the ICAO, adopted modest efficiency goals for the aviation sector of 2% fuel efficiency gains 
per annum until 2050, and agreed to work towards establishing a goal of capping emissions 
from aviation at 2020 levels91. The ICAO also agreed to investigate the possibility of a 
market-based mechanism forming the base of a global trading scheme for international 
aviation 92 . However Kulovesi believes that “[o]verall, despite recent advances, the 
multilateral frameworks created under the ICAO and IMO […] for reducing emissions from 
aviation and shipping remain relatively weak”93. 
Following the ‘failure’ of the ICAO to produce a binding international agreement on aviation 
emissions94, and in light of the problems posed by growth of emissions from the aviation 
sector, the EU’s move to “fill the gaps in the current international climate change regime”95 
                                                   
83 Kulovesi (2012), supra note 10, at 196.  
84 Kulovesi (2012), supra note 10, at 194. 
85 Anger (2010), supra note 50, at 39. 
86 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, 2303 
UNTS 248. 
87 Kulovesi (2012), supra note 10, at 195. 
88 Massai L., The Kyoto Protocol in the EU: European Community and Member States under International and 
European Law (2010: TMC Asser Press, the Hague), at 29ff.  
89 Article 2(2) states: “The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working 
through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, 
respectively”. 
90 Kulovesi (2012), supra note 10, at 196. 
91 See ICAO Assembly, ‘Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and Practices related to 
Environmental Protection –Climate Change’ (2010) ICAO Assembly Resolution A37-19. Available at: 
http://legacy.icao.int/env/A37_Res19_en.pdf. Accessed 21 March 2013.  However, as stated above, by 2020 
aviation will be one of the leading causes (if not the leading cause) of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU.  
92 ICAO (2010), ibid, at paragraphs 13-18 and Annex. See also Kulovesi (2012), supra note 10, at 197.  
93 Kulovesi (2012), supra note 10, at 198.  
94 Aviation and shipping have been on the UNFCCC agenda since the first COP in 1995; see Kulovesi (2012), 
supra note n10, at 196.  
95 Bogojević (2012), supra note 19, at 349. 
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should not have come as a surprise. With regard to border carbon adjustments, like the EU 
ETS, Kulovesi writes that their “very rationale […] relates to defects at the multilateral level: 
their purpose is to address concerns over carbon leakage and environmental integrity in a 
situation where an effective multilateral legal framework for climate change mitigation is 
lacking”96.  
The Commission put forward its legislative proposal only when faced with what it considered 
to be an institutional failure at the international level 97 . Moreover, and with crucial 
implications for the discussion in Chapter IV, the Aviation Directive is clearly phrased in 
complementary language in line with the EU’s commitments to multilateral solutions. It states 
that the “Community and its Member States should continue to seek an agreement on global 
measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from aviation” and that the “Community 
scheme may serve as a model for the use of emissions trading worldwide”98. Deepening its 
commitment to international cooperation, the Aviation Directive also allows exemptions for 
those third states that put in place similar measures to combat emissions from aviation99. The 
Commission has signalled its readiness to participate in these discussions with third states100. 
This so-called ‘escape route’ grants the EU the flexibility necessary to truly cooperate with 
third states, as well as partake in multilateral negotiations. The Commission also has the 
power to consider an amendment to the Directive if an international agreement to reduce 
aviation emissions is signed101. The inclusion of these provisions “shows that the EU has 
chosen a measured approach in responding to current drawbacks at the global level to deal 
with climate change”102. 
Nevertheless, the ‘unilateral’ nature of this move has predictably resulted in far-reaching 
criticism of EU’s climate change policy at the international level. This includes accusations as 
to the use of unilateral trade measures and extraterritorial jurisdiction in violation of 
international law, and of failing to respect the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities’ 103 in the implementation and design of the 
Aviation Directive104. The controversial feature of the Aviation Directive is that it includes 
emissions taking place during the “last leg” of international flights105. As a result, emissions 
produced by a US flight over US territory must be accounted for by the US airline 
surrendering EU emissions allowances to an EU Member State under the EU ETS 106 . 
Naturally some third states have found this notion offensive107. Moreover, the Commission 
began work on the Aviation Directive in parallel with the international negotiations taking 
place under the aegis of the ICAO, which may be interpreted as a pre-emptive move by the 
EU.  
                                                   
96 Kulovesi (2012), supra note 10, at 199. 
97 Bogojević (2012), supra note 19, at 348. 
98 See Bogojević (2012), supra note 19, at 348. See also Aviation Directive, recital 17, Preamble and Article 
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Despite this, in terms of EU law and policy, the Aviation Directive is nothing less than a 
shrewd exercise of policy-making that plays to the EU’s strengths, while employing language 
and concepts that are clearly respectful and encouraging of international law and multilateral 
solutions. As such, the Aviation Directive is a perfect show of force in terms of the EU’s 
environmental leadership claim: a progressive piece of legislation, utilising but never 
exceeding the full breadth of the EU’s environmental competence, in a manner that is 
consistent and coherent with the EU’s international obligations. Having now outlined the two 
instruments at the core of the ATAA case and briefly set them in a wider socio-political 
context, let us turn to the legal context: the competences in EU law used to establish, extend 
and maintain the EU ETS.  
B. EU environmental competence 
The choice and nature of these competences is central to the functioning of the EU’s 
environmental and climate change policy, which must respect the principle of conferral of 
powers108 as well as the rules on decision-making. The choice of legal basis determines the 
relevant decision-making procedure and the involvement of the different EU institutions. 
Thus it may affect policy development priorities. Any study of EU primary law must 
necessarily begin with an analysis of the general principles of EU law and the Lisbon Treaty 
consisting of the Treaty on European Union109 and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union 110 . The final subsection will outline the EU’s role, responsibilities and 
competences as an actor in international environmental law, as they are envisioned and 
stipulated in the Treaties.  
Following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2011, some questions remain as to the true 
magnitude of changes brought about regarding the EU’s external environmental 
competence111. Characteristic of many of these changes is that on the one hand, the EU is 
moving towards increased constitutionalism in its legal system while Member States on the 
other hand fear the transfer of sovereignty from state to Union level112. At the fundamental 
level of EU law, the fear of the latter is clearly reflected in the requirement to explicitly assign 
competences to the EU, emphasised in Article 4(1) TEU, and reiterated in Article 5(2) TEU. 
Further, the explicit list of competences113 and Protocol 2 on the application of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality reinforce a sense of an apparent restraint as to the transfer 
of sovereignty. Vedder suggests however that although the form of environmental 
competence is somewhat altered, the reality is that the Lisbon Treaty largely represents a 
codification of the status quo. What, then, are the present-day climate change-related 
environmental competences of the EU? 
                                                   
108 TEU Article 5. Article 5(1) states that: “The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of 
conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.” 
109 TEU.   
110 Treaty on the Function of the European Union (Consolidated version) [2010] OJ C83/47. 
111 See Vedder H., ‘The Treaty of Lisbon and European Environmental Law and Policy’ (2010) Journal of 
Environmental Law 22:2, 285. 
112 Sciolino E., ‘French Voters Soundly Reject European Union Constitution’ (30 May 2005). Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/30/international/europe/30france.html?pagewanted=all&_r=. Accessed: 21 
March 2013. The Guardian, ‘Dutch say ‘devastating no’ to EU constitution (2 June 2005). Available at: 
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113 TFEU Articles 2-6. 
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i. General principles of EU law  
The foundation of the rule of law and the balance of powers within the EU legal system can 
be derived from the general principles of EU law, codified in the TEU. These principles guide 
the procedural, substantive and constitutional functions of all areas of EU law, including 
environmental law. This section will highlight those general principles that interrelate in a 
significant way with the EU’s climate change policy. The principles featuring most 
prominently in this way are the principle of sincere cooperation114 and principle of conferral 
or attribution of powers115, the principle of subsidiarity116. 
The defining, and arguably most important, feature of the general principles is the principle of 
conferral of powers in Article 5(2) TEU. Unlike the other principles dealt with in this section 
that have largely substantive functions, the principle of conferral of powers is a formal 
requirement. It states that the EU may only act in so far as specific competences have been 
granted by the member states, and then only in the pursuit of the Treaty objectives117. This 
principle entails two constitutional limits on EU legislative acts. Firstly, the existence of a 
substantive competence granted in the Treaties, and secondly the choice of appropriate legal 
basis. It thus relates firstly to the determination of EU competence within a particular area, 
and secondly to the decision-making procedure applied in the implementation of an EU act. 
For our purposes, the two are closely related. The identification of a specific competence for 
regulating aviation emissions (and thus determining the applicable decision-making 
procedure) has not been an issue with regard to establishment of the EU ETS and the 
introduction of the Aviation Directive. Yet the applicable decision-making procedure (thus 
antecedently also the choice of legal basis) may become relevant in the wake of the ATAA 
case should the EU or the Member States choose to change policy direction. In case of 
contesting opinions, the applicable decision-making procedure could determine which one 
prevails.  
The conferral of powers is further complicated by the division of policy areas into fields of 
exclusive and shared competences118. Environmental policy and energy policy are expressly 
stated to be fields of shared competence119. This means that member states are free to act so 
long as the EU has not acted, or has deregulated that specific field. Yet this does not mean 
that the environmental policy of the EU does not at times extend into areas of exclusive 
competence, and even take on an exclusive characteristic120. Hey argues that the nature of the 
competence exercised by the EU within a certain field may have implications for the way that 
the CJEU interprets international agreements in that field121. Such implications include the 
possibility of self-executing terms in international agreements carrying over into EU law, as 
well as impacts on the operation of direct effect with regard to certain international 
provisions. This could potentially impact the way the Court interprets interactions between 
international environmental agreements and the EU ETS, for instance. She refers to precedent 
                                                   
114 TEU Article 4(3). 
115 TEU Article 5(2). 
116 TEU Article 5(3). 
117 TEU Article 5(2). 
118 TFEU Article 2. 
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120 See for instance the CJEU case law on the doctrine of implied powers, especially the Judgment of the Court 
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20 
 
in the field of Common Commercial Policy (a field of exclusive competence122), questioning 
whether the approach of the Court would differ in an area of shared competence such as 
environmental law. While the Treaties have for some time clearly listed the internal 
competences of the EU, the same could not be said for its external competences123. This 
resulted in the development of secondary categories of implied external competences, which 
have now largely been internalised and legislated in the Lisbon Treaty. This matter has to 
some degree been settled by the CJEU in its Open Skies jurisprudence124, where the Court 
affirmed the EU’s exclusive treaty-making competence with regard to civil aviation125. In 
essence, this means that for the purposes of this thesis, the external competence of the EU in 
regulating emissions from aviation is exclusive.  
The principle of subsidiarity governs the vertical division of competence and the 
implementation of acts respectively. This may be relevant in the post-ATAA scenario 
described above as a means of determining whether the opinion of the EU or the Member 
States weights more heavily. Vedder argues that the application of this principle is largely 
unchanged under the Lisbon Treaty 126 . This means that as our understanding of the 
interrelation between climate change and human activity deepens, it is increasingly clear that 
the transboundary nature of environmental issues requires effective solutions to be 
implemented at EU level, thus satisfying the subsidiarity test. In addition, it may even be 
argued that the principle of subsidiarity demands that the scope of climate change measures 
decided at EU level should be extended further, as corroborated by the CJEU’s Open Skies 
jurisprudence above. 
Finally, the principle of sincere cooperation states that member states shall ‘ensure the 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties’, and ‘shall facilitate the achievement 
of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of 
the Union’s objectives’127. It has been suggested that the principle, or as it is increasingly 
referred to – the duty – of sincere cooperation is “one of the ‘foundations’ of the [Union] 
legal order as a whole, if not one of [sic.] ‘constitutional principle of the EC Treaty’ to which 
the Court forcefully referred in its Kadi ruling”128. In practice, this can lead to both a further 
blurring of the purportedly clear distinction between shared and exclusive competences129, as 
well as a streamlining effect with regard to external action.  
                                                   
122 TFEU Article 3. 
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In this subsection we have seen that although the general principles relate only loosely to 
establishment of the EU ETS, they may play a significant part in its maintenance – especially 
if the Member States and the EU disagree on the way forward. Additionally, it may be argued 
that in its treatment of the external factors in ATAA, the Court is considering the distinction 
between exclusive and shared competences. This may offer some explanation as to why the 
Court chooses a rather narrow interpretation of which international provisions are applicable 
in the case.  
ii. Express Treaty-based competence 
Beyond the general principles, the Treaties are intended to lay down, in a non-restrictive 
manner130, the specific objectives and substance of EU environmental policy. Furthermore, 
the provisions contained within them form the legal bases used by the EU legislators to 
satisfy the principle of conferral of power. As such, the provisions of the Treaties mark the 
extent of the EU’s environmental competence.  Having said that, Vedder correctly points out 
that the true extent of the EU’s environmental competence – concerning as it does, an 
evolving and dynamic policy area 131  – cannot be grasped through the provisions of the 
Treaties alone. Instead, in order to gain an accurate idea of the exact division of competences 
between the EU and the member states, one must study the specific secondary legislation132 
adopted by the EU legislators who enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in deciding what is 
appropriate environmental policy133. With this in mind, the competences outlined in these 
subsections represent the formal competences of the EU, whereas the practical competences 
may be more accurately gleaned from the Directives on the EU ETS.  
a. Treaty on European Union 
The question of environmental competence features prominently in the TEU134. In addition to 
the reference to environmental protection in the preamble135, Article 3 TEU includes a ‘high 
level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment’ as objectives of the 
internal market136. This objective is traceable back to Article 2 of the Treaty of Maastricht137, 
which called on a balanced approach to economic growth on the one hand and sustainable 
development and environmental protection on the other. The principle of a ‘high level’ of 
environmental protection is considered by Jans and Vedder to be “the most important 
substantive principle of European environmental policy”138 due to its inclusion among the 
general objectives139. This principle is usually employed to justify far-reaching environmental 
requirements, and is referred or alluded to in numerous other Treaty provisions and is often 
cited in the academia and by the Court (including the ATAA case140). Furthermore, the 
principle of a ‘high level’ of environmental protection also features in Article 37 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union141. This means that the ‘right to a high 
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level of environmental protection’ is recognised in EU primary law, and moreover due to its 
inclusion in the CFREU, it is recognised as a fundamental right142 - a distinction of some 
significance, as discussed in section 4C.  
It should be noted that a ‘high level’ of protection is not the same as the ‘highest’ level. The 
CJEU has stated (in the context of (now) Article 191(2) TFEU) that the standard to be set at 
EU level must not be the lowest common denominator amongst member states, but neither 
must it necessarily be the technically highest achievable level of protection: 
“whilst it is undisputed that Article 130r(2) [Article 191(2) TFEU] of the Treaty requires 
Community policy in environmental matters to aim for a high level of protection, such a level of 
protection, to be compatible with that provision, does not necessarily have to be the highest that 
is technically possible” 143 
In other words, the harmonized standard should be set at an appropriate level, and is 
presumably a moving target144. It is also noted that the inclusion of environmental protection 
provisions in the TEU is closely linked to the increasingly broad reference to ‘sustainable 
development’145, a concept which has evolved from the sustainable development of economic 
activities 146  into ‘the sustainable development of Europe’. In light of the Commission’s 
findings and reasoning in relation to the Aviation Directive (refer back to section 2Aii), it 
may be added here that if Europe is to remain on a sustainable path, Article 3 clearly provides 
a basis for extending the scope of the EU ETS to cover aviation activities. This expansion of 
the concept of sustainable development is in line with the increasing horizontal integration of 
environmental policy into other policy areas. Moreover, Article 3 also makes an express link 
between the EU’s sustainable development policies and free and fair trade, indicating the 
possibility of an external relations mandate. A connection can once again be drawn to the 
Aviation Directive, which relates to the trade of transportation services – a link that may seem 
tenuous, but has been raised as an argument justifying the extra-territorial impacts of the 
Aviation Directive147.  
The integration of environmental action in the EU’s external policies features centrally in the 
TEU; “the EU’s external environmental action is expected to contribute to the other 
objectives of the Union’s external relations, such as supporting human rights, preventing 
conflicts and encouraging the integration of all countries into the world economy” 148 . 
Pertinently in this regard, Article 21 TEU places the EU under a general obligation to 
‘promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the 
United Nations’149. The clarity and importance of the EU’s obligation to the UN framework 
will form one of the cornerstones of this essay, and will become relevant in numerous 
ways 150 . Moreover, the connection between the EU’s trade and environmental policy is 
                                                                                                                                                              
policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development” recognized in 
the Treaties as primary law under TEU Article 6. 
142 Mayer (2012), supra note 82, at 1136f. 
143 Case C-284/95 Safety High-Tech v S. & T. Srl [1998] ECR I-4301, para 49. 
144 Duran (2012), supra note 20, at 15.  
145 Jans and Vedder (2012), supra ntoe 134, at 10f.  
146 Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated version) [2006] OJ C321E/1, Article 2. 
147 See section 4C below. See also See Hertogen (2012), supra note 13, at 14. 
148 Morgera E., ‘Ambition, complexity and legitimacy of pursuing mutual supportiveness through the EU’s 
external environmental action’ (2012) Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2012/02, at 2. 
149 TEU Article 21(1) second sentence. 
150 See section 2Biii on the EU’s international actorship. See also section 4B on common but differentiated 
responsibilities.  
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emphasised further in Article 21 TEU151. Not only are these objectives to guide the EU’s 
common foreign and security policies, but they are also subject to a horizontal integration 
requirement152. As a result, environmental protection and sustainable development must be 
taken into consideration in the development and implementation of nearly all EU external 
action 153 . The EU is additionally under a humanitarian-natured obligation to assist 
populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters154 . Yet the 
probability of successfully arguing a link between the global nature of the environmentally 
harmful effects of aviation emissions and the impacts these are having in developing 
countries155  is undeniably remote. Nevertheless, as a result of these provisions the EU’s 
pursuit of a multilateral agreement on climate change is fuelled by both willingness and a 
legal obligation arising from the TEU itself.  
The TEU clearly provides a strong basis for environmental action, going so far as to nearly 
provide the EU with a mandate for external environmental action. Not only does the TEU 
contain a broad environmental competence, but actually stipulates that the competence should 
be used to achieve a “high level” of protection. A further development in the TEU is the 
successive expansion of the EU’s environmental agenda; environmental protection is no 
longer a distinct field of action, but a policy priority that is intended to permeate all levels of 
EU policy. Finally, although the provisions are of a general nature they seem to go so far as to 
imply an obligation on the EU to conclude international agreements on the environment in 
order to achieve its multilateral objectives and further the goal of horizontal environmental 
harmonization.  
b. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union sets out some of the more specific 
responsibilities and competences of the EU. Environmental policy is first mentioned in 
Article 4, which affirms its position as an area of shared competence. Recalling the above 
discussion on the difficulties in delimiting competences, the practical relevance of this 
provision could however be called into question.  
Article 11 TFEU 156  contains a provision known as the ‘environmental integration 
requirement’, one of the oldest integration requirements in EU primary law. Article 11 traces 
its roots to the First Environmental Action Programme157 and was formally recognised in the 
Single European Act158. Under the Lisbon treaty the environmental integration requirement 
features amongst the non-hierarchical general and specific integration requirements159, but is 
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the most strongly phrased amongst these 160 . It states that “[e]nvironmental protection 
requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union policies 
and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development” 161 . This 
environmental integration requirement contained is considered by some to be “one of the 
most important aspects of EU environmental law”162. Article 11 TFEU is perhaps the most 
significant substantive iteration of the EU’s environmental objectives and competence outside 
of the Environment Title. Although it is phrased as a prima facie obligation as opposed to a 
competence (using the word ‘must’ as opposed to ‘shall’ or ‘may’163), it has wide-ranging 
implications for the ability of the EU to take environmental considerations into account. 
According to Duran, this can be seen as placing both a negative and a positive obligation on 
EU legislators. Firstly, to refrain from interfering with the achievement of the objectives 
stated in Article 191 TFEU, and secondly, to actively support the achievement of those 
objectives164.  
The objective of Article 11 is to “ensure a certain ‘horizontal coherence’ (or 
complementarity) between the EU’s external environmental policy and other policy 
dimensions of its relations with third countries and regions”165, although it should be noted 
that Article 11 in no way restricts itself to external policies alone. As mentioned before, an 
obligation on the EU to integrate its environmental policy in all areas of activity could be 
linked to the Commission’s reluctance in the case of the Aviation Directive to stand by and 
wait for a multilateral solution that may or may not materialize. A legal obligation to integrate 
environmental protection in the EU’s policies and activities could be interpreted as having the 
objective of securing a ‘high level’ of environmental protection from within the various 
sectors of EU activity. This in turn could be seen as obligating the EU to preserve or ‘support’ 
the viability of its environmental policies, as argued by Duran166, including the EU ETS. At a 
stretch, it could be argued that Article 11 compels the EU to take certain necessary steps to 
ensure the success of its existing environmental policies – as outlined above, aviation 
emissions posed a direct and pressing danger to the viability of the EU ETS167, and had to be 
tackled sooner rather than later. Applying this argument to the CJEU, this obligation would 
require the Court to adopt an interpretation of EU law that has a positive or a neutral effect 
with regard to environmental protection168. This should be kept in mind in the later review of 
the Court’s judgment in ATAA – especially as regards the Court’s interpretation of the 
‘equivalence clause’169 (so-called in this thesis for the sake of clarity, mindful of the fact that 
reference to ‘equivalence’ was specifically dropped by the Council during the negotiations 
leading up to the Aviation Directive170) contained in the Aviation Directive.  
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Before moving on to the Environment Title, one last provision of the TFEU must be covered. 
Subject to Article 351 TFEU171, international agreements concluded by Member States before 
accession to the EU take priority over EU law. According to Craig & DeBurca, this amounts 
to an effective exception to the principle of supremacy of EU law172. The extent of this 
principle was tested by the CJEU in Commission v UK173. Interestingly this case concerned 
the conclusion of “open sky” agreements between the US and numerous Member States. 
Having concluded the Bermuda I Agreement with the US Government in 1946 followed by 
the Bermuda II Agreement in 1977, the UK was offered a revision of the Bermuda II terms in 
1992. The UK signed the revised agreement in 1995 (the Netherlands had done the same in 
1992) despite a formal letter of notice from the Commission stating that air transport was 
within the exclusive competence of the Commission. The UK argued that due to the new 
terms constituting an ‘update’ of an agreement signed prior to accession, rather than a new 
agreement, they were covered by the exception in Article 351 TFEU. Referring to the text of 
the preamble to the Bermuda II Agreement, which stated that the latter was ‘replacing’ 
Bermuda I, the CJEU held that the Bermuda II Agreement was indeed a new agreement, and 
thus fell outside the scope of Article 351 TFEU. Further, it was demonstrated by the CJEU in 
Commission v Italy174 that a member state may not rely on an international agreement (the 
GATT, in this case) to escape obligations under EU law (the free movement of goods in this 
case). This was reaffirmed in T. Port175, which made it more or less clear that Article 351 
TFEU is intended only to ensure the third state concerned that the relevant Member State is 
unable to rely on EU law as a means of escaping its obligations under the relevant agreement. 
However, Article 351 may not be relied upon in any internal situation, as this is outside of its 
scope176. In Burgoa177, the Court clarified a significant limitation to Article 351 TFEU – it is 
incapable of binding the EU as such regards the third country. This case will be the focus of 
considerable attention in the following chapters. The reason for this can be gleaned from 
Kaczorowska’s concluding remarks on Article 351 TFEU: “[i]n practice, the principle 
contained in [Article 351 TFEU] poses difficult problems for national judges in the case of a 
conflict between international agreements and [Union] law”178. 
We have seen that the TFEU, despite laying out only the formalities of the EU’s 
environmental competence, can be interpreted as having significant practical implications. A 
reading of Article 11 TFEU as requiring the EU to ‘support’ or ‘preserve’ its level of 
environmental protection could result in tension with international law down the road. This is 
most pertinent in a situation where the EU’s environmental action has implications on third 
counties; the EU, as a result of its environmental ambitions and its economic power, has the 
capacity (and the obligation) to implement a ‘high level’ of environmental protection. A 
problem arises when the EU expects and requires other states (states that may lack the 
capacity and conditions of the EU) to match its own actions, especially in the context of an 
international legal framework that is naturally suspicious of such demands. Article 351 TFEU 
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represents a further source of friction between EU law and international law, exacerbated by 
an arguable misapplication of the provision by the Court in ATAA, as will be discussed in 
section 4Aiii.  
c. Title XX TFEU on the environment 
Having covered the general Treaty provisions relating to the EU’s environmental 
competence, we will now turn our attention to the environmental title of the TFEU179 which 
sets out the specific of the EU’s environmental competence.  
In accordance with the principle of conferral of powers, Article 191 TFEU sets out the prime 
environmental objectives of the EU180. These include preserving, protecting and improving 
the quality of the environment and promoting measures at international level to deal with 
regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change. 
As Duran notes, it is obvious from these broad objectives that the Lisbon Treaty does not take 
a restrictive approach to the EU’s Treaty-based environmental competence. It is reasonable to 
assume that this is a result of the transboundary nature of environmental problems in general 
and climate change in particular, and is designed to allow the EU legislators a wide margin in 
deciding upon the most effective and appropriate means of dealing with developments181. The 
emphasis on climate change in the last objective in paragraph (1) was added in the Lisbon 
Treaty and is of particular interest to us. It seems to suggest that climate change is the most 
prominent global concern facing the EU, and certainly “singles out climate change as the 
global environmental issue on which the EU must promote action at international level”182.  
Read together with the integration requirement in Article 11 TFEU and the multiple 
references to sustainable development objectives throughout the Treaties, it is clear that 
climate change policy is intended to be the centrepiece of the EU’s environmental policy and 
must be one of its highest priorities on the international stage. The wording of the fourth 
objective in paragraph (1) – “regional or worldwide environmental problems” – also seems to 
suggest that the territorial scope of the EU’s actions (especially with regard to climate 
change) is not limited to the EU’s territory. According to Duran this indicates that “the EU 
can also take measures targeting the environment beyond its borders, in the same way in 
which its Member States can do so, within the limits imposed by international law on the 
extraterritorial application of domestic environmental law.”183 
She also notes the support granted to this interpretation in the Kramer case184, where the 
CJEU held that with regard to fishing over the High Seas, the EU’s territorial competence and 
authority mimic those of the Member States. In any case it seems evident that there is room 
for extraterritorial environmental objectives. Moreover, the tie between the international 
scope of the EU’s environmental competence, seen here, and its prioritisation of climate 
change policy is of course more than a mere power-grab by the EU – the objective behind a 
successful climate change policy must naturally be to improve not only the domestic 
environment but global environment as a whole185. There is much debate surrounding the 
extent to which the territorial scope of Article 191(1) could and should be applied. This 
approach to the (extra)territorial application of the EU’s external environmental competence 
                                                   
179 TFEU Environment Title XX. 
180 TFEU Article 191(1). 
181 Jans and Vedder (2012), supra note 134, at 32. 
182 Duran (2012), supra note 20, at 13. 
183 Duran (2012), ibid, at 14. 
184 Kramer, supra note 120.  
185 Jans and Vedder (2012), supra note 134, at 37f. 
27 
 
can be used as a basis for arguments relating to the extra-territorial implications of the 
Aviation Directive as referred to in sections 4Ciii and iv.  
Article 191(2) contains the specific principles of environmental law, which are to be given 
legal force in the acts implementing environmental policy. Paragraph (2) states that the EU’s 
environmental policy ‘shall aim’ at a ‘high level’ of environmental protection that ‘shall be 
based’ on the precautionary principle, the preventive principle, the source principle and the 
polluter pays principle. The principle of a high level of environmental protection is a 
restatement of the wording found in Article 3(3) TEU and Article 37 CFREU, and as already 
stated, is considered one of the most important principles of EU environmental law186.  
The ‘precautionary’ principle aims to deal with the risk of environmental damage before the 
harm takes place187. It is also recognised as a principle of international environmental law 
subject to Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration188, not to mention the reference to precautionary 
action in Article 3 of the UNFCCC189. According to Rajamani, “[t]he precautionary principle 
is seen by some as evidence of a paradigm shift in international environmental law, from the 
ad hoc and reactive approaches that characterised early environmental regulations, to the 
precautionary regulation that is on the increase today.” 190  Subject to the precautionary 
principle, action to protect the environment can be taken before scientific evidence can 
conclusively prove that an activity or product is harmful to the environment, as is the case 
with the Aviation Directive191. According to European Commission guidelines, it also gives 
the Union the right to establish what it deems to be an appropriate level of environmental 
protection192. In relation to the ‘public health’ ground, the CJEU has stated as to the risk 
assessment procedure that: 
“Where it proves to be impossible to determine with certainty the existence or extent of the 
alleged risk because of the insufficiency, inconclusiveness or imprecision of the results of 
studies conducted, but the likelihood of real harm to public health persists should the risk 
materialise, the precautionary principle justifies adoption of restrictive measures, provided they 
are non-discriminatory and objective.”193   
Whatever the level of the risk assessment applied under the precautionary principle, it could 
be argued that in the case of airline emissions causing climate change, the scientific data 
available today would certainly support precautionary action against increasing emissions. 
Moreover Driesen points out the practical advantage of a precautionary approach in so far as 
it provides the most cost-effective means of combating climate change, the results of which 
are not rapidly reversed194. 
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The ‘rectification at source’ principle states that environmental damage should as a priority be 
rectified at source 195 . It implies a preference for emissions standards rather than 
environmental quality standards196, as this encourages those actors or entities closest to the 
source to alter their behaviour. It is further reasonable to assume that those closest to, or 
responsible for, the source of pollution are best placed to bring about a reduction in the 
damage being done. This is especially relevant to the airline industry, which spends large 
sums of money on research and development. If airlines were to pay a price for their carbon 
dioxide emissions, they would not only have an incentive to reduce their emissions (under a 
market-driven system, they may even profit by doing so!197) but would also be in the best 
position to do so.  
Lastly, the ‘polluter pays’ principle is closely linked to the ‘rectification at source’ principle. 
According to this principle, the polluter should bear the cost of polluting – certainly a factor 
in the Aviation Directive, which has even been referred to as “a European-wide 
environmental aviation ‘polluter-pays’ scheme”198. Part of the reasoning behind this principle 
is to harmonize the way costs of rectifying pollution are allocated in different Member 
States199. This has the effect of minimising competitive distortions that have a negative effect 
on the internal market (for instance state aid to cover the cost of pollution for business), and 
of advancing environmental objectives in a coherent manner. Furthermore, the principle 
means that a European measure should not place the cost of remedying pollution on a person 
or undertaking that is not responsible for that pollution200. The reasoning behind the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle is obvious when applied to the airline industry. In line with the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’201, airlines are using a public good (the environment) to profit without accounting 
for all the costs. As ‘there is no such thing as a free lunch’, the matter is simply one of tracing 
the cost elsewhere – in this case, to those who will suffer the effects of climate change 
brought about by greenhouse gas emissions. What we then have is an externality or a 
misallocation of cost and liability202 – the few profit at the cost of the many203. The ‘polluter 
pays’ principle is an attempt to internalize the negative externality so created; in other words, 
to lift the cost off the many and place it by the responsible few. Airlines would presumably 
pass on part of the increased cost on to passengers. However, even so causality is easier to 
establish between pollution from aviation and the few who choose to pay for flying than the 
many who do not. To restate the reasoning applied to the ‘rectification at source’ principle: 
those closest to the source are best place to reduce the resulting harm204, whether that be 
through increased efforts to minimise aircraft emissions by airlines and manufacturers, or 
through alternatives means of travel by passengers. This may ring truer yet in the context of a 
market-based solution such as a cap-and-trade scheme; the IPCC’s Fourth annual Assessment 
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Report states that “[m]arket pressures […] determine fuel efficiency and CO2 emissions”205, 
and so “[c]arbon pricing could effect further emissions reductions if the aviation industry 
introduces further technology measures in response”206. 
Finally, as this thesis is concerned with the external dimension of the EU’s environmental 
actions, it should be emphasised that many of these principles are recognised also as 
principles of international environmental law: the ‘precautionary’ principle is reflected in 
principle 15 of the Rio Declaration207, the ‘prevention’ principle formed the foundation of the 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal 208  and principle 16 of the Rio Declaration contains the polluter pays 
principle209.  
From the key provisions of the TFEU we have learned that climate change policy is 
prioritised in the EU’s external action, and that internally the EU possess some competence to 
act extra-territorially in environmental matters. Through the principles laid out in Article 
191(2) TFEU, the Lisbon Treaty reaffirms the EU’s pursuit of a high level of environmental 
protection; strives to encourage cost-effective environmental action; seeks to obligate 
environmental damage to be mitigated by those best placed to do so – that usually being the 
party responsible for the damage. In this way, the TFEU also seeks to minimise misallocation 
of responsibility and resources, and to disincentivise freeriding.  
iii. The EU as an actor in international climate change policy 
According to Macrory and Hession the traditional approach of international law to sovereign 
actors is that “only states are recognised as having legal personality in international law and 
therefore only states are capable of maintaining rights and contracting responsibilities”210. 
International legal personality is required to have standing, and standing is necessary in order 
to be a party to an agreement. As such, the EU’s capacity to act on the international stage has 
not always been certain, and indeed it was not until the negotiations leading up to the 
Montreal Protocol on the protection of the ozone layer211 that the EU was able to assert its 
international actorness in environmental matters212 . Today the EU is considered to have 
international legal personality213 subject to Article 47 TEU214, also described as the “strongest 
statement of the European Union’s external presence”215. Thus EU accession is possible for 
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most multilateral agreements 216 , likely resulting from the importance of the EU as an 
‘environmental norm generator’217.  
Article 191(4) contains the key provision on the EU’s external environmental competence as 
mentioned above – its Treaty-making power. Subject to this provision, the EU can enter into 
environmental agreements even where the specific subject matter of the agreement is not yet, 
or is only marginally, covered by the EU’s internal competence218. The substance of this 
competence is determined according to Article 191(1) and (2). In accordance with Article 
4(2) TFEU, Article 191(4) grants the EU a ‘shared competence’ in environmental policy. 
While this allows Member States to legislate within the shared competence, it also means that 
they are prevented from doing so with regard to subject-matter already covered by an EU 
legislative act. As a result, the second subparagraph of Article 191(4), intended as a response 
by the Member States to the pre-emption doctrine219, has created considerable confusion since 
its introduction in the Single European Act220. This could be taken to mean that despite the 
shared competence in environmental policy, Member States could negotiate international 
agreements even where the EU has adopted internal rules on the same subject-matter. 
However this would have implied a significant departure from the doctrine of implied 
powers, consisting of the principle of parallelism from the ERTA case221 and the principle of 
complementarity from Opinion 1/76222. The CJEU in ERTA clearly rejected the possibility 
that Member States could negotiate international agreements on areas covered by EU internal 
rules, stating that the EU’s treaty-making power is an exclusive competence (affirmed by the 
CJEU in the Open Skies cases with regard to the civil aviation). To this effect a Declaration 
was included in the Final Act of the Single European Act stating specifically that the ERTA 
doctrine was not affected by paragraph (4), presumably as a means of reinforcing the shared 
as opposed to exclusive nature of the competence. And yet Article 351 TFEU makes it clear 
that this is irrelevant at least in the case of the CICA, which predates the cut-off point 
specified in Article 351 – obviously this carries implications for the Court’s treatment of the 
applicability of the CICA in the ATAA case223.    
Having established the EU’s international actorship and Treaty-making powers, we must now 
consider what these may or must be used for. This framework can be referred to as the EU’s 
international environmental responsibility. The Sixth Environment Action Programme 
“stresses the need for a positive and constructive role of the European Union in the protection 
of the global environment”224. Two distinct types of development can be identified in this 
regard; on the one hand is the substantive body of environmental law either enacted at EU 
level with the aim to affect or protect the environment outside the territory of the EU, or in 
which the EU participates on the multilateral level.  On the other hand, EU law lays out 
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certain rules for the interaction between itself and international law – these rules can be 
summed up as a constitutional obligation to respect international law225.  
It appears, then, that the EU considers environmental action with out-of-borders 
implications226 a responsibility of an international actor – and needless to say, specifically the 
responsibility of an economically developed actor227. As a result, an aspect of the EU’s 
international actorship is the potential for extraterritorial environmental action and objectives. 
A Treaty-basis for such action is found in Article 191 TFEU, especially as regards climate 
change policy228. In this respect Article 191 goes to the very core of the climate change 
problem – ultimately, a global phenomenon calls for a global solution. Under the aegis of 
Article 191 the EU has become party to the multilateral Vienna Convention for the protection 
of the ozone layer229 and its Montreal Protocol230, as well as the UNFCCC and its Kyoto 
Protocol; the bilateral OSA Protocol to the Air Transport Agreement231; and it has ratified the 
CICA, although it is not a party thereto.  
The amendment to Annex I of the ETS Directive232 introduced by the Aviation Directive can 
also be said to fall under the ‘out-of-borders’ objective articulated in Article 191 in so far as it 
subjects emissions taking place outside the EU’s territory to the EU ETS233. The question of 
the extent and quality of the territorial competence granted by Article 191 is extremely 
relevant. Jans and Vedder pose this question in terms of Article 191 in general; “the phrase 
‘regional or worldwide environmental problems’ is still unclear in several respects. For 
example, is it intended to exclude unilateral measures?” They also question whether “action 
to protect the environment of only one or a few third states is excluded”, and conclude that:  
“there is a lot to be said in favour of not interpreting Article 191 TFEU too narrowly. Nor should 
unilateral environmental measures or environmental measures directed at protecting the 
environment in only one state or a few states a priori be excluded, even though the problem of 
the international law constraints of such measures is at its most pronounced in this very case.” 234 
These international law constraints will form an important element of the evaluation of the 
Court’s ATAA judgment in section 4C. 
As for the EU’s responsibility to respect international law, the EU Treaties contain numerous 
references to the EU’s international obligations and its environmental responsibility at the 
international level. One of the environmental actions emphasised by the EU’s external agenda 
under the Lisbon Treaty is the promotion of “an international system based on stronger 
multilateral environmental cooperation and good global environmental governance”235. This 
commitment is articulated in Article 3(5) TEU where it is stated that “[i]n its relations with 
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the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to 
the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to […] to the strict observance and the 
development of international law”236. 
The general provisions on the EU’s external action are equally clear. Article 21(1) TEU 
places the EU under a general obligation to “promote multilateral solutions to common 
problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations”237, while Article 21(2) TEU 
provides that the EU shall “consolidate and support […] the principles of international 
law”238, “help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the 
environment” 239  and “promote an international system based on stronger multilateral 
cooperation and good global governance” 240 . Finally, the Environment Title expressly 
subjects the EU’s external environmental policy to the obligation to respect international law, 
stating that “the Union and the Member States shall cooperate with third countries and with 
the competent international organisations”241. 
In examining the EU’s international actorship, it is found that the EU has legal personality 
granting the capacity to partake in international agreements. This capacity also includes 
external treaty-making powers. EU law stipulates that this capacity be used in a certain way. 
This places a two-fold responsibility on the EU. Firstly, to seek to protect the global 
environment as opposed to the environment within the EU. Secondly, in seeking to fulfil its 
other responsibilities, the EU is obligated to respect international law and encourage 
participation in and uptake of multilateral solutions. It is, in other words, equipped with the 
tools of structural leadership.  
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the EU ETS as well as the Aviation Directive lie 
well within the EU’s environmental competences – in other words, they are lawfully 
implemented tools of EU environmental policy, aimed at achieving the objectives of the 
Treaties. The following chapter seeks to identify the role of the CJEU in enforcing this 
delicate balance. How does – and how should – the Court mediate between a progressive but 
controversial provision of national law on the one hand, and a recalcitrant, but ultimately 
malignant, body of international law on the other?  
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3 The Court of Justice of the European 
Union as an environmental actor  
“In the name of preserving ‘the rule of law’ the Court has developed principles of a 
constitutional nature as part of EU law. […] These principles have defined the very nature of the 
EU, constitutionalizing it and distinguishing it from other international Treaties. They were 
especially significant in the years of so-called institutional malaise or stagnation. The Court 
rendered the Treaty and EC legislation effective when the provisions had not been implemented 
as required by the political institutions and the Member States. This was exemplified by the 
ECJ’s role in the creation of the internal market, requiring removal of national trade barriers, at 
a time when progress towards completing the Single Market through legislative harmonization 
was hindered by institutional inaction”242. 
A. The role of the judiciary in environmental protection 
As warden of the Treaties, the Court of Justice of the European Union has accumulated a reputation as 
a galvanizing force in areas of EU policy where the political will to pursue development has abated.   
In light of the reputation of the Court, this section will briefly consider the role of the CJEU in the 
EU’s pursuit of a formidable climate change policy. In doing so, this section will reflect on whether 
the CJEU can be said to have any obligations and responsibilities beyond interpreting the law in 
accordance with the rule of law.  
The CJEU’s mandate is set out in Article 19(1) TEU243, providing that the Court ‘shall ensure that in 
the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed’. It was argued in chapter II that 
the Aviation Directive is a lawful exercise of the EU’s environmental competence, aimed at achieving 
the environmental objectives of the Treaties in accordance with the principles of environmental law. 
Can it be argued that the Court should consider such aims in its interpretation, and would it also be 
possible to imply an obligation on the Court to provide an interpretation of the Aviation Directive so 
as to maximise its chances of success?  
In this case, one overarching environmental policy of the EU is the pursuit of environmental 
leadership, through its climate change policy, so as to allow for the greatest impact of the EU’s 
environmental policies. Does the Court in this manner have a role in advancing, to the best of its 
ability, the EU’s environmental leadership ambitions? It is clear that Craig and de Burca in the above 
cited passage, believe that the Court, in many regards, is willing and able to take action beyond the 
call of duty. This may be because the Court’s jurisprudence “is generally described as purposive or 
teleological, although not in the sense of seeking the precise purpose of the authors of a text […] The 
Court rather examines the whole context in which a particular provision is situated, and gives the 
interpretation most likely to further what the Court considers that provision sought to achieve”244. The 
reason why this approach is necessary was outlined by the Court in the CILFIT judgment 245 . 
According to Kaczorowska, Article 19(1) can even be interpreted as meaning that it is the mission of 
the Court “not only to apply the law expressly laid down by, or under, the [Treaties] but, more 
importantly, to promote its continuous development, to supplement its provisions, and to fill gaps in 
the [Treaties]”246. This goes some way to explaining the activist role often assumed by the Court. This 
very role has been criticised by Rasmussen as paving the way for a possible usurpation of power by 
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the judiciary247, and by Neill as a tool for the Court to advance its own political interests248. This 
criticism is thus one aimed at the ‘constitutional’ role of the CJEU – a role defended by Jacobs. Jacobs 
attributes some of the criticism of the Court’s constitutional role to, amongst other things, the lack of 
constitutional jurisprudence in some Member States. He goes on to argue that the Court plays an 
invaluable role in balancing Union and Member State interests, and developing EU law in conformity 
with the rule of law249. Jacobs thus believes that it is natural, and even inescapable that the Court’s 
role should include a constitutional element. Craig and DeBurca also note that the Court’s “role as an 
institutional actor in the [EU] integration process should be recognized.”250 
Moravcsik for instance believes that the constitutional role of the CJEU is justified in as much as it 
allows the EU to overcome the prisoner’s dilemma and the problem of the free rider, which would 
otherwise be associated with co-operation on a supranational level. Through the agency of the Court, 
Member States are prevented from enjoying the benefits of the co-operation unless they uphold their 
obligations as part of that co-operation251. Recalling the problem of the free rider in relation to 
international co-operation mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the constitutional role of the 
CJEU becomes almost obvious. It allows the EU to effectively perform the supranational functions 
which international co-operation has so far failed to produce. It has also been argued that it is 
misguided to see the Court as a mere agent of the designers of the EU – such an approach fails to 
account for the Court’s creation of the concept of Union citizenship as one example. Along this line, 
Stone Sweet argues that “the ECJ authoritatively reconstituted the Community in ways that linked the 
demand for and supply of European law and courts to the activities of market actors, and then to all 
activities governed by EC law. Constitutionalisation not only positioned the courts as primary arenas 
for negative integration; it made them supervisors of positive integration, and creators of a growing 
corpus of rights which the Court found in the Treaty itself.”252 To this effect, Kaczorowska points out 
that “[i]n interpreting Community law, the ECJ takes into consideration the evolving nature of the 
Community and thus interprets Community law in the light of new needs which did not exist at the 
time of ratification of the Founding Treaties”253.  
The argument advanced by this thesis is that the role of the Court in fact does extend beyond merely 
interpreting EU law in strict accordance with the rule of law. Rather, the rule of law and the unique 
structure of the EU require the Court to perform a wider role, which may include interpreting EU law 
in the way that it most conducive to advancing the relevant Treaty-objectives. This thesis argues that 
in the ATAA case, the relevant Treaty-objectives include first and foremost a ‘high level’ of 
environmental protection254, implemented in accordance with the principles of environmental law255, 
so as to support the achievement of the EU’s environmental objectives256 (including climate change 
leadership through an effective EU ETS) in a manner that respects international law257 and promotes a 
multilateral solution258. This catalogue covers only the most fundamental Treaty-objectives, and is 
thus not intended to be exhaustive. It is evident that reconciling all these objectives is a Herculean task 
that is not disposed to neat solutions. In other words, the Court is faced with the near-impossible task 
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of reconciling EU law, international law and national law in the context of the interrelation of the EU 
institutions, international organisations, the Member States and third states, in accordance with EU 
law – which as demonstrated, does not provide for clear-cut answers. The author believes that 
precisely because of the impossibility of arriving at an exact solution capable of accommodating often 
diametrically opposed views, the Court should have abstained from a strict textual interpretation. In 
ATAA the Court should have adopted the approach of a constitutional court and made a purposive 
interpretation aiming at a reasonable balance between the objectives here presented, or it should have 
given preference to a ‘lead objective’ and moulded its judgment in a manner consistent with that 
objective. With this in mind, the next section aims to impart an image of the Court in its moments of 
transformational leadership: a Court that is willing to approach a difficult question of law as a 
constitutional court would, and if necessary to ‘reconstitute’ that law. 
B. The CJEU: a legacy of progressive activism 
Following the creation of the European Union, a quiet consensus existed amongst the Member States 
that the relationship between EU law and national law would follow the standard theory of 
international law – that states would remain entirely sovereign, although they may have to exercise 
their sovereignty subject to the restrictions of that international law. They would thus be, for all intents 
and purposes, the “masters of the treaties”259. This impression was perhaps rudely shaken with the 
statement of the Court that the Treaties establish a “new legal order of international law for the benefit 
of which the state have limited their sovereign rights”260. As if to clarify the message, the Court made 
it plain in Costa v ENEL, decided the following year, that “the EEC Treaty has created its own legal 
system which […] became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their 
Courts are bound to apply” and that “the Member States have limited their sovereign rights […] and 
have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves”261. As Chalmers, 
Davies and Monti put it, “[i]t would be difficult to overstate the radicalism of Costa. The claim that 
EU law enjoys some form of sovereignty means that the Union’s legal power cannot be seen as 
deriving from the Member States, but must be understood instead as being autonomous and 
original”262. The Court pursued the extension of this concept of ‘sovereignty’ in numerous subsequent 
cases; it established the supremacy of EU law over national constitutional law in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft263 and it introduced a requirement for all national courts to set aside national laws 
that conflict with EU law264. The resilience to this day of the notion of the supremacy of EU law, 
established in these cases, remains testament to the considerable transformational force of the Court’s 
jurisprudence. Moroever, in van Gend the Court did more than hint at supremacy – in a ‘ground-
breaking judgment’ it also introduced the direct effect of EU law. This meant that for the first time, 
individual applicants could seek the enforcement of their rights under EU as opposed to national law, 
before national courts. This judgment “was […] characterised by a vision of the kind of legal 
community that the Treaties seemed designed to create”, and provided “an early example of the ECJ’s 
teleological methodology”265. The Court built on this purposive interpretation in Defrenne v Sabena266, 
where it introduced the horizontal direct effect of the Treaties; in Van Duyn267 where it established the 
vertical effect of Directives; and in Von Colson268 and Marleasing269, where the Court developed the 
doctrine of indirect effect. Even then, individuals in certain cases were left without means to redress 
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under EU law270. Thus in Frankovich271 the Court explicated that the subjects of the EU legal system 
are “not only the Member States but also their nationals. Just as it imposes burdens on individuals, 
Community law is also intended to give rise to rights which become part of their legal patrimony”. 
Frankovich is seen as a momentous event in EU legal history, particularly because negotiations on the 
Maastricht Treaty had only recently ruled out the possibility of state liability272. Moving beyond the 
state, the ERTA273 judgment – mentioned above – in which the Court created the doctrine of implied 
Treaty-making powers, extended the Court’s purposive interpretation beyond the territory of the EU.  
Beyond the general consitutionalisation of EU law undertaken by the Court, some particular fields of 
law have been substantially altered as well. Internal market law was largely revitalized and shaped by 
the Court’s intervention through its Dassonville274, Cassis de Dijon275 and KECK276 judgments. It is 
also within the context of the internal market that the Court first became involved in environmental 
law. Yet, the approach of the Court to environmental law could in some ways be seen as even more 
exceptional than in the internal market; an EU competence on common commercial policy was well-
established before the CJEU’s involvement. In environmental law, on the contrary, the CJEU 
anticipated the Treaties in ADBHU 277  by describing environmental protection as ‘one of the 
Community’s essential objectives’, before any environmental competence existed apart from within 
the internal market. According to Lee, this “important decision allowed for the possibility of an 
autonomous environmental policy” 278 . In Danish Bottles the Court affirmed its statement from 
ADBHU that the “environment is a key objective of the EU” 279  and introduced environmental 
protection as part of the Cassis ‘rule of reason’280. The Court further chose to insert environmental law 
into Article 36 as ‘so closely linked’ to human health that the two should be considered together281. In 
Preussen Elektra282 the Court helped to carve environmental protection into the fabric of the internal 
market with regard to state aid, strengthening the overall position of environmental concerns in the EU 
legal order. The ECJ has not stopped here, however. It has gone as far as to hint at the application of 
criminal penalties in the enforcement of environmental law283 – a controversial stance, considering 
that criminal law is explicitly excluded from the EU’s competences. Finally, in ATAA the CJEU went 
some way to establishing itself as an EU environmental protection hawk at the international level. It is 
clear that the Court has come a long way in terms of environmental protection. But it could go further 
still. 
With that in mind – this thesis promised to draw a possible parallel between the Court’s development 
of its jurisprudence in the fields of environmental law and fundamental freedoms and human rights. 
Certainly the Court’s case law on fundamental freedoms, alongside that on the internal market, 
constitutes one of its most transformative forays into a specific field of law. The history of EU 
fundamental rights begins, unsurprisingly, with the van Gend and Costa judgments. As a result of the 
absence of reference to fundamental freedoms or human rights in the Treaties, the supremacy of EU 
law created a lacuna of fundamental freedoms: fundamental freedoms in national constitutional law 
could not be used to justify action that conflicted with the Treaties, because EU law took precedence 
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over national constitutional law. Yet fundamental freedoms were not a component of EU law284. Thus 
those that existed could not be relied upon, and those that could be relied upon did not exist. 
Recognising this outcome towards the end of the 1960’s, the Court began to introduce the language of 
fundamental rights into its jurisprudence; in Van Eick285 the Court held that the administrators of staff 
disciplinary procedures at EU institutions were ‘bound in the exercise of [their] powers to observe the 
fundamental principles of the law of procedure’. In Strauder286 the Court was more direct, and spoke 
of ‘fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of [EU] law and protected by the 
Court’. Yet the content of these ‘fundamental human rights’ was uncertain, and left national courts no 
option but to either refuse to apply EU law (and opt to apply the established fundamental rights 
contained in their constitution) or to apply EU law (and its unresolved corpus of fundamental human 
rights).  
The Court sought to bridge this limitation in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft287, where it held that 
“an examination should be made as to whether or not any [guarantee analogous to national 
constitutional concepts] inherent in [EU] law has been disregarded. In fact, respect for fundamental 
rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice”. A 
back-and-forth between national constitutional courts and the CJEU ensued, with one national court 
essentially concluding that national fundamental rights will take precedence over EU law so long as 
the EU lacks a sufficiently rigorous fundamental rights doctrine of its own. By 1986 the German 
Constitutional Court felt that EU law did indeed reflect the fundamental rights contained in the 
German Constitution, and that “[a]s long as this was the case, the German Constitutional Court would 
no longer review the validity of specific Union acts in the light of national fundamental rights”288. 
While the Court’s development of EU fundamental rights in the shadow of the supremacy dispute has 
been criticised as being driven by ulterior motives, that reasoning can hardly be said to apply to the 
Court’s later, and more progressive, jurisprudence289. The Court has shown at multiple occasions its 
sensitivity to national fundamental freedoms, and how these may at times take precedence over rules 
of EU law. This was the case in Omega290, where German police interfered with Omega’s Article 56 
TFEU freedom to provide services (in this case, a laser-tag game). Paragraph 1(1) of the German 
Constitution protects human dignity, and according to the German court, exempted a violation of 
Article 56 TFEU. In its judgment, the CJEU found that the infringement of Omega’s Article 56 
freedoms was indeed justified as “the Community legal order undeniably strives to ensure respect for 
human dignity as a general principle of law” – a general principle of law with no explicit basis in the 
Treaties, that as a result must have been drawn from the German Constitution.  
The culmination of the EU’s protection of fundamental rights – and the development that the CJEU 
ought to have replicated with regard to environmental protection in ATAA – is the Kadi judgment291. 
In the run up to Kadi, the UN Security Council adopted a Resolution requiring states to freeze the 
assets of individuals on a list of suspects having links to Al Qaeda. In the EU, the UNSC Resolution 
was implemented by Regulation subject to Article 352.  In 2001, the applicants were put on the list 
and their assets were frozen. Kadi challenged the Regulation before the General Court where which 
the claim failed. An appeal was allowed by the ECJ on the grounds that the Regulation violated 
fundamental rights. In his opinion, AG Maduro recognised the Court’s and the EU legal system’s 
obligation to be mindful of, and respect, the international legal order as one that is at times better 
placed to ‘weigh fundamental interests’. The similarity between the two fundamental concepts of 
human rights and environmental protection is evident. Both are, in essence, universal concepts – the 
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effective protection of which, in the home state, is but the first battle in a long war fought on the 
international stage of politics, and eventually, law. This, too, is recognized by the Advocate General; 
“the Court cannot, in deference to the views of those [international] institutions, turn its back on the 
fundamental values that lie at the basis of the [EU] legal order and which it has the duty to protect. 
Respect for other institutions is meaningful only if it can be built on a shared understanding of these 
values and on a mutual commitment to protect them” 292.  
The parallel with environmental protection and climate change in particular is once again painfully 
clear. Even if we were able to agree that anthropogenic climate change is a fact, and that it carries 
devastating consequences, there would still be an indisputable shortage of ‘mutual commitment’ to do 
anything about it. Thus, the Court in Kadi sets out to justify its rejection of the UNSC Resolution on 
the basis of a constitutional exception293; “fundamental rights form an integral part of the general 
principles of law whose observance the Court ensures” – the Court draws these fundamental rights 
from ‘international instruments’, the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, and the 
ECHR in specific. On this basis, the Court found that “the obligations imposed by an international 
agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty”294. In 
hindsight, Kadi represents a CJEU equivalent of the BVerfG ‘so lange’ judgment, stating that the EU 
will honour its legal obligation to respect and promote international law, so long as it does not run 
counter to the fundamental or constitutional ideals of the EU. It is the author’s opinion that while the 
CJEU’s environmental jurisprudence has covered considerable ground, ATAA was an opportunity for 
the Court to take the same step taken in the field of fundamental rights in Kadi.   
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the CJEU has over time assumed the role of a 
constitutional court of the EU. In this role, it is well within the ambit of the Court to consider the 
wider ambitions of the EU in the relevant policy areas – and at times, the Court may be required to 
‘reconstitute’ the law in order to enable the achievement of Treaty objectives such as a high level of 
environmental protection. We have seen that the Court has a long history of judicial activism, often 
aimed at overcoming stalemates in stagnant policy areas. In the next chapter, the Court’s interpretation 
of EU law as well as international law will be analysed. Its interpretation will then be contrasted 
against previous cases and academic opinions, as a means to suggest what alternatives the court could, 
and perhaps should, have pursued. In the final section of this chapter, a parallel was discussed between 
the CJEU’s approach to fundamental rights, and its treatment of environmental protection and climate 
change cases. This parallel will form the basis of the last argument, and final section, of this thesis.  
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4 Interpretation and leadership 
ambitions 
The key legal test of leadership up to this point has been the ATAA case and the political 
dialogue it has generated both inside and outside the EU. Both aspects raise concerns 
regarding the internal consistency of the EU’s actions with regard to its own laws, and as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, the interaction between those laws and international 
law. The first section of this chapter will examine the various stages of the ATAA case. The 
second section will discuss some of the successes and failures experienced as a result of the 
case. The third section will conclude with a round-up of the most relevant academic 
arguments relating to those experiences, highlighting areas of improvement and future 
developments needed to strengthen the EU’s claim to climate change leadership.  
A. Responding to challenges: revelations from the ATAA case 
The first legal development in the international challenge to the Aviation Directive came in 
the form of the legal action started before UK courts in 2009 by American Airlines, 
Continental Airlines, United Airlines and the Air Transport Association of America (ATA) as 
to the validity of the Directive. Before the UK High Court, the applicants presented three 
main arguments. Firstly, it was argued that the EU had acted outside of its powers and had 
violated customs of international law, the principle of exclusive sovereignty of states in 
particular, in its attempt to regulate the activities of foreign operators over the high seas and 
the territory of third states295. Secondly, the applicants argued that Article 2(2) of the Kyoto 
Protocol296 amounts to an exclusive mandate for the ICAO to negotiate an agreement on 
aviation emissions. Thirdly, that the EU ETS amounts to a tax and as such violates the 
principle of freedom of air transportation from charges under the 1944 Convention on 
International Civil Aviation297 and the Open Skies Agreement298. The High Court chose to 
stay the proceeding and submitted the case to the CJEU for a preliminary reference299 on 
certain questions relating to the compatibility of the Aviation Directive with international and 
EU law.  
i. The preliminary reference 
The question at the core of the preliminary reference was whether the EU has the ability to 
unilaterally control emissions from aviation in the absence of an international framework. In 
other words, the case is one “concerning the legitimacy of regional regulatory responses to 
global institutional failings”300. Predictably, the case attracted attention far beyond the narrow 
confines of the law, specifically in the field of international politics and the academia. Before 
the CJEU had even passed its judgment on the preliminary reference, the matter had been the 
subject of an open letter by the US Secretary of State301 – urging the EU to abandon unilateral 
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action on aviation emissions – and of legislation enacted in both the US and in China, 
banning national carriers from participating in the EU scheme302. All in all 28 states had 
shifted their diplomacy over the Aviation Directive denouncing EU unilateralism and 
pressuring the ICAO to declare its opposition to the Directive303. Moreover in March 2012 
China resorted to retaliatory measures against the European aircraft manufacturer Airbus304, 
leading to internal pressure from Member States and the already sceptical European airline 
industry305 to scrap the plans for expansion306. Nevertheless, the political machinery of the 
EU persisted in its chosen course and the reference appeared before the CJEU.  
The preliminary reference asked firstly which of the below international laws could be relied 
upon to challenge the Aviation Directive.  Following from the arguments before the UK 
courts, the international provisions involved were the CICA, the OSA, the Kyoto Protocol 
and four principles of customary international law; sovereignty over airspace, incapacity to 
exert sovereignty on the high seas, freedom to fly over the high seas, and that aircraft flying 
over the high seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their country of registration. 
Secondly, the reference asked the CJEU to assess the validity of the Aviation Directive 
subject to three arguments. The first argument concerned jurisdiction, and alleged that the EU 
exerted extra-territorial jurisdiction in breach of the principle of sovereignty by regulating 
flights outside its territory. The second argument went to the EU’s capacity, alleging that the 
decision to unilaterally regulate aviation emissions was ultra vires in light of the mandate 
given to the ICAO under existing international agreements. The final argument was free trade 
related, and accused the EU ETS of being tantamount to a tax or charge prohibited by 
international treaties307.  
ii. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott 
According to AG Kokott, the jurisprudence of the CJEU is quite restrictive as to the direct 
effect of international law as means for challenging EU acts. In order to have direct effect, 
two conditions must be satisfied: i) the EU must be bound by the agreement, and ii) the broad 
logic of the agreement must not preclude review while setting out unconditional and 
sufficiently precise rules308. AG Kokott finds that as the EU has not signed the CICA, it 
cannot be bound by it309. She found that although the EU is boundby the OSA and the Kyoto 
Protocol, most provisions of their provisions nonetheless falil under the second leg of the test 
as being either conditional or insufficiently precise. Applying the above conditions, she 
similarly found the presented principles of customary internationally law to be too broad for 
an individual to rely upon. As a result, she considered that only two provisions of the OSA 
could be relied upon to assess the validity of the Aviation Directive.  
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Despite this, and for the avoidance of doubt, AG Kokott set out to assess the validity of the 
Aviation Directive against all the international provisions presented, as if they could be relied 
upon310. Responding to the jurisdiction argument, AG Kokott did not find that the EU ETS 
contained any extra-territorial provisions 311 , drawing a distinction between internal rules 
(flights must surrender allowances for emissions to and from EU airports) and external rules 
(airlines must take steps Z and Y to reduce emissions on flights to and from EU airports)312. 
This distinction could be very relevant in terms of the EU’s environmental competence in 
case of international legal action, as the EU certainly possesses the competence to do the 
former, but may not have the external competence required for the latter313. AG Kokott also 
pointed out that national legislation concerning taxes or competition law often take into 
consideration circumstances that take place outside the nation’s territory314. In order for a 
provision not to be extra-territorial in the sense alleged, an “adequate territorial link” and the 
“absence of any adverse effect on the sovereignty of third countries” are required 315 . 
Referring to environmental protection and climate change policy, she states that greenhouse 
gas emissions may have to be taken into account as they “can have effects on the environment 
and climate in every State and association of States”316. This also “reflects the nature as well 
as the spirit and purpose of environmental protection and climate change measures” as well as 
the polluter pays principle317. Although the Advocate General’s sentiments regarding the 
borderless nature of emissions and climate are a perfect reflection of the reality of the 
problem, the potential ramifications of this particular approach, with close association to the 
‘effects doctrine’ 318 , have been covered widely in the academia and will receive closer 
attention in section 4C.  
As to the question of capacity, AG Kokott states that while the Kyoto Protocol does call on 
parties to participate in ICAO negotiations, this requirement is complementary and not 
exclusive of other action 319 . She also states that the question of when to institute 
complementary regional responses in the face of institutional failure is one to be decided by 
policymakers with an eye to expediency – in order to do this, the EU institutions must be 
given certain discretion320. This means that not only do they have the discretion to decide on 
the expediency of a regional solution, but they also decide when such discretion applies321. 
AG Kokott concludes that in light of Kyoto Protocol compliance periods and the inaction of 
the ICAO, the EU’s actions in terms of the Aviation Directive can be described as neither 
premature nor unilateral322 . Furthermore, the OSA does not prevent (non-discriminatory) 
unilateral action where none has been taken by the ICAO – to the contrary, had the EU not 
included foreign airlines in the EU ETS (but nonetheless wished to include the entire length 
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of the journey to/from EU airports), then the Aviation Directive would have infringed the 
OSA due to its discriminatory effect to the detriment of EU carriers323.   
Finally, she found that as a market-based mechanism, with prices varying subject to supply 
and demand, the EU ETS could not be held to be equivalent to a tax or a charge324. 
iii. Judgment of the Court 
On the whole the Court followed the Advocate General’s opinion closely, although it was 
slightly less restrictive in its interpretation of applicable international law. As a result of the 
reference primarily concerning matters relating to international law, and as with the Opinion, 
much of the Court’s judgment addresses the direct effect of the relevant provisions of 
international law as tools for “assessing the validity of Directive 2008/101”325. In this respect, 
the Court establishes that, subject to Article 216(2) TFEU326, international law will “prevail 
over the acts of the European Union”327 – that is to say, international law has supremacy over 
EU law. As a result, an act of EU law may be invalid where it is incompatible with a 
(supreme) provision of international law328. Where such incompatibility is alleged, it is for the 
CJEU to determine, subject to certain conditions, whether pursuant to Article 267 TFEU329 
the act of EU law is amenable to review in respect of the provision of international law330. In 
order for a provision of international law to form a basis of assessment, the EU must be 
bound by that provision331; the application of the provision to the EU act at hand must not be 
precluded by the nature and broad logic of the former332; the provision must be unconditional 
and sufficiently precise333; and the provision must not be subject, “in its implementation or 
effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure”334.  
Applying these conditions to the international agreements concerned in the case, the Court 
follows the opinion of the Advocate General: because the EU has only ratified the CICA and 
is thus not a party to it, and because “the powers previously exercised by the Member States 
in the field of application of the CICA have not to date been assumed in their entirety by the 
European Union, the latter is not bound by that convention”335. According to the Court it is 
however clear that the EU is a party to the Kyoto Protocol, and that “its provisions form an 
integral part of the legal order of the European Union”336, meaning that the first condition is 
satisfied. As such, the particular provision at issue – that is, Article 2(2)337 – must fulfil the 
three remaining conditions. The Court finds that while the Kyoto Protocol is clear as to the 
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objectives to be achieved, it leaves room for flexibility as to the means used338, and in any 
event Article 2(2) is not sufficiently clear or unconditional to confer rights upon an 
individual339. This means that the particular provision of the Kyoto Protocol cannot be relied 
upon in this case340. As with the Kyoto Protocol, the provisions of the OSA form an integral 
part of the EU legal order341. In this instance however the Court finds that the agreement does 
indeed confer rights upon individuals (in this case, airlines) against the parties to the 
agreement, “as it aims to create a fair and equal opportunity for airlines to compete in the 
international aviation transportation”342. Unlike the Advocate General, the Court found that 
the ATA is not prevented from invoking the Article 11 OSA condition of reciprocity, 
although the Aviation Directive clearly satisfies the condition343. On the applicability of the 
principles of customary international law, the court detracts somewhat from the Opinion344. 
While the Court finds that these principles can be relied upon in so far as they “call into 
question EU’s regulatory competences and, moreover, affect rights of individuals”345, or “at 
least (given the lack of precision of these principles) in case of ‘manifest errors of 
assessment’”346.  
Turning to the question of the validity of the Aviation Directive, the Court followed the 
Advocate General in that it rejected all three arguments, although it did so on the basis of 
somewhat different reasoning. Firstly, the Court justifies the application of the Aviation 
Directive to the ‘last leg’ of the flight on territorial grounds, all the while affirming its stance 
that “[t]he European Union must respect international law in the exercise of its powers”347. 
The Court echoes the Advocate General in stating the Aviation Directive applies only to 
flights landing at, or departing from EU airports348, but adds that once an aircraft has landed 
at an EU airport and is physically within the EU’s territory, it is subject to the “unlimited 
jurisdiction of the EU”349. Relying on the high level of environmental protection requirement 
set in Article 191(2) TFEU, the CJEU interprets customary international law as providing that  
“the European Union legislature may in principle choose to permit a commercial activity […] 
to be carried out in the territory of the European Union only on condition that operators 
comply with the criteria that have been established by the European Union and are designed to 
fulfil the environmental protection objectives which it has set for itself, in particular where 
those objectives follow on from an international agreement to which the European Union is a 
signatory, such as the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.”350 
Although it will be argued below that the Court’s statement at paragraph 125 may be nothing 
more than a confirmation of the normal operation of the international law principle of 
jurisdiction, the above excerpts read together do seem bold. It may be said firstly that the 
CJEU believes that the EU’s environmental competence allows it to set environmental 
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conditions on commercial operators situated outside the EU, with activities within the internal 
market. Secondly, the Court believes that international environmental agreements, 
implemented in EU law through separate acts of the EU, can justify the regulation of foreign 
economic operators acting wholly or in part within the internal market. That is, the intentions 
of the international community, articulated through (for instance) the Kyoto Protocol, can 
justify regional responses following multilateral institutional failure351. One should also note 
that the Court follows the reasoning of the Advocate General in questioning whether the 
territoriality link is broken in the case of emissions taking place outside the territory of the 
EU. The Court states that “the fact that […] certain matters contributing to the pollution of the 
[…] territory of the Member States originate in an event which occurs partly outside that 
territory is not such as to call into question […] the full applicability of European Union law 
in that territory”352. While the Court is not mistaken in this analysis, it will be argued below 
that the phraseology employed is at best unfortunate, and at worst harmful to the EU’s 
environmental leadership.  
The CJEU dispatches the capacity argument relating to the Open Skies Agreement in similar 
fashion to the Advocate General, as allowing non-discriminatory unilateral measures in the 
absence of international standards353. The Court then goes on to agree with the Advocate 
General in regards to the final argument as to free trade under the OSA, distinguishing the EU 
ETS from a ‘charge’ prohibited by the agreement. The Court argues that the EU ETS cannot 
amount to a tax as the scheme is subjected to market forces, meaning that a diligent 
participant may even stand to make a profit 354 . The Court and the Advocate General 
consequently arrive at the same conclusion, upholding the Aviation Directive on all counts.  
B. Interpreting the Court’s judgment 
Before delving into the legal arguments and their consequences, it is important to set the 
ATAA judgment into a wider social context. As discussed, the case brought much tension to 
the surface – some of it old (a powerful state acting heedless of international rules), and some 
of it new (the reaction of airlines and manufacturers from all part of the globe). Although 
predicted, the judgment of the Court resulted in an international uproar and further 
denunciation of the EU’s climate change policy, which has had a negative impact on the EU’s 
environmental leadership. This section will outline the primary political and economic 
concerns raised in the aftermath of the ATAA case. These incidents will be used as a basis for 
arguing that while the international reception of the judgment was never going to be 
welcoming, the Court certainly did not do much to temper fears over the implications of the 
Aviation Directive. 
Firstly, a considerable political backlash followed the ruling. There is talk that the Aviation 
Directive will affect India’s position on future climate change negotiations 355  (which, 
counter-intuitively, only strengthens the case for unilateral action as will be discussed in 
section 4C). India is also coordinating a multilateral ‘Coalition of the Unwilling’356, and in 
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2011 initiated talks between 21 states on a common position on the Aviation Directive357. 
These talks led to a Declaration being presented to the ICAO, endorsed by 26 states358. These 
states met again in Moscow in 2012, where 23 states decided on the possibility of additional 
retaliatory measures359. These measures include legal action under the dispute settlement 
mechanism of the CICA and review of legality subject to WTO law. Most measures however 
relate to the denial of economic privileges of the EU and its airlines360. Secondly, and in 
addition to the multilateral responses contemplated by the ICAO members, some states have 
instigated unilateral responses against the EU. China is alleged to have prevented a national 
carrier from placing a large order with Airbus, the European aircraft manufacturer 361, in 
addition to threatening further defensive action against the EU 362 . The US State and 
Transportation Departments are investigating retaliatory possibilities 363 , while the US 
President has signed a law making it illegal for American companies to comply with the EU 
ETS364. China365 and India366 have similar rules in place. Thirdly, as mooted in the ICAO 
talks, legal action poses a further threat to the future of the Aviation Directive. Chinese 
airlines are considering similar action to that of the ATA, but are ‘waiting for the most 
appropriate time to file’367. The Aviation Directive may be challenged under Article 19 of the 
OSA and before the ICAO Council subject to Article 84 of the CICA. Interestingly, a 
decision of the Council may even be appealed to the ICJ, emphasising the importance of the 
international case law relied upon in section 4C.  
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One oft-argued matter (see for instance arguments by China Air Transport Association368, and 
India369) with regard to potential legal action against the Aviation Directive is that of the 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ – or the principle of ‘developed country 
leadership’370. CBDR is dealt with separately from the legal arguments in section 4C as it was 
not raised before the CJEU in ATAA, and it would thus be inappropriate to attribute any of the 
potential weaknesses of the Aviation Directive in this regard to the CJEU. However, in light 
of the leadership theme of this essay, the author feels that CBDR ought to be considered in 
the Aviation Directive and as such, some arguments are included below.  As stated before, the 
EU is under an obligation to promote multilateral solutions to common problems, particularly 
within the framework of the UN371, and has adopted CBDR as a guiding principle in its global 
action372. In addition, CBDR is well-established in international law373. It consists of two 
elements; firstly, that some problems (such as climate change) are common (universal) and 
require the participation of all states. Secondly, that while all states are required to participate, 
their level of participation should be differentiated in accordance with their contribution to the 
problem in the first place (thus CBDR is closely related to the principle that the polluter 
pays374), as well as with their capacity (technological, know-how etc) to participate (although 
Rajamani argues that these are, in fact, two incompatible approaches to the same question375).  
It can clearly be said that the Aviation Directive satisfies the first element of CBRD, in that 
the EU is assuming leadership on aviation emissions where otherwise a vacuum would exist. 
It is less clear whether the Aviation Directive offends the second element. Driesen offers the 
prevention of stratospheric ozone depletion as a successful example of the second element of 
CBDR – developed countries took on the responsibility to phase out many of the ozone-
depleting substances that they had, for a long time, been using and marketing to developing 
countries. Only ten years after this phase-out, would developing countries come under an 
obligation to begin reducing their consumption. This allowed developed countries to invent 
and produce safe substitutes, which could be phased-in by the developing countries in time to 
meet their obligations 376 . Specifically, CBDR “calls for financial help and technology 
transfer”377 – something that cannot be said to be a central feature of the EU ETS in the same 
way that it was in the Montreal Protocol.  
Scott and Rajamani present the authoritative opinion that “the Aviation Directive fails to 
reflect adequately the demands of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities” 378 . They note the Commission’s argument 379  as to the 
inapplicability of the principle to the EU ETS, due to the principle addressing only measures 
by states whereas the scheme applies only to business. They reject this argument owing to the 
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role of third states in the Aviation Directive. For instance, the activity of a third state, subject 
to the equivalence clause380 can determine which set of rules (i.e. the EU ETS or a scheme of 
the third state) an airline is subject to. Moreover, the Aviation Directive demands the same 
action of both developed and developing countries in order to satisfy the equivalence clause. 
Scott and Rajamani explain the EU’s lack of finesse in this regard as the result of a non-
discrimination approach coupled with the hope to avoid letting the ‘richest developing 
countries completely off the hook’. They rightly argue that instead of seeing states on the 
basis of a sharp developed/developing distinction, the EU should have adopted a more 
nuanced understanding of CBDR381. This nuance could for instance have been reflected in the 
level of ‘equivalence’ demanded under Article 25a of the Aviation Directive382, although this 
would risk inconsistency with the EU’s own law383 as well as WTO law384. The second 
proposal advanced by Scott and Rajamani is less problematic, and more reminiscent of that 
approach taken in the Montreal Convention – applying the revenues raised in association with 
developing country flights to a global climate change fund used to finance measures in those 
countries385. Thus Scott and Rajamani argue that although the Aviation Directive fails at 
present to sufficiently account for the CBDR principle, the task of rectifying this shortcoming 
is well within the grasp of the EU386. Moreover, it could go some way to bolster the EU’s 
environmental leadership credentials.  
Moving on to the wider context, the international response to the Aviation Directive has had 
an impact on resolve within the EU, with France asking the Commission to compromise with 
third states387, as a result of and in addition to the lobbying of the European airline industry388 
for a similar move. With regard to this internal tension, it is interesting to note one aspect of 
the Environmental Title of the TFEU which we have not yet covered (due to its specific 
relevance in this issue). Article 191(3)389 sets out the policy aspects that the EU “shall take 
account of” in preparing its environmental policy. Owing to the relatively weak imperative 
used in this paragraph, it has been argued that it is subordinate to the objectives and principles 
found in paragraphs (1) and (2) respectively390. Paragraph (3) requires the EU to consider the 
potential benefits and costs of its action or lack of action. Jans and Vedder write that 
“[b]esides producing benefits for the environment, environmental action by the Union entails 
costs for […] private actors, such as industrial plants which cause pollution, and 
manufacturers […] of goods and products which are harmful to the environment.”391 
It should be borne in mind that this is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can be used 
by the EU to justify environmental action on the basis of environmental cost. On the other 
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hand, it can be used against such action on the basis that the economic costs implied are 
disproportionate to the environmental gain – one of the concerns that may have fuelled 
French hesitance on the Aviation Directive. Paragraph (3) also asks the EU to consider the 
economic and social development of the Community as a whole and the balanced 
development of its regions, thus allowing for a multi-speed environmental policy 392 . A 
potential application of this consideration for the purpose of this thesis may be higher sector-
specific allocation plans for certain Member States particularly reliant on the aviation sector, 
however this would conflict with the ‘polluter pays’ principle as well as the principle of 
‘rectification at source’. 
Most importantly however, the international response to the Aviation Directive (and in part, 
to the CJEU judgment) has caused the Commission to ‘stop the clock’393 on the enforcement 
of the Aviation Directive against foreign airlines for a year, so as to give the ICAO Council 
time to agree to an international regime on airline emissions at its meeting in September 
2013. Naturally, a policy-move such as this involves a gamble. On the one hand, it puts 
considerable pressure on the laggards of international aviation policy to negotiate in ‘good 
faith’ at the next ICAO meeting, and serves to show that the EU is committed to compromise 
and, above all, a multilateral solution. On the other hand, it will be taken as a sign of 
weakness and dissipating will. Here, a buckling executive and a hesitant judicial branch 
combine to damage the work of a legislature which passed a resourceful measure to deal with 
a persistent problem, in a manner consistent with its own law and respectful of international 
law (although the CBDR principle offers room for improvement).  
The gamble may pay off before the end of the year. The question is what happens if it does 
not? When, and if, enforcement against foreign airlines begins at the end of the year, matters 
will once again come to a head. This is when the Chinese airlines will pursue their case 
against the EU with improved arguments, and when cases will be launched before the WTO 
and ICAO Council. Redoubled commitment and conviction will be required of the Member 
State and the EU institutions. At this point, the reluctance of the CJEU to make a clear stand 
for the fundamental and constitutional status of the EU’s climate change policy in ATAA will 
become a burden. “Probably for reasons of jurisdictional policy, the Court avoided entering 
into any value-based question and arbitrating between climate change mitigation and civil 
aviation. Yet, sooner or later, these questions will be asked again in different cases.”394 The 
following, and final section, will investigate some of the legal questions that were left 
unanswered in ATAA, and which the Court is likely to face again.  
C. Missed opportunities in the ATAA judgment 
i. Semantic isolationism: the Court’s choice of terminology and norms  
This section is concerned with the substantive relationship between EU and international law, 
and two points in particular; 1) how the Court perceives this relationship, and 2) how the 
Court’s perception of the relationship is viewed from an international perspective. The 
arguments made here refer mostly to the terminology relied on by the Court to describe 
concepts that have perfectly acceptable international law equivalents, and the Court’s decision 
to exclude certain norms from its assessment of the Aviation Directive.  
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Mayer describes the frustration of international aviation lawyers at the exclusion of the CICA, 
which, at the very least, symbolises “the growing isolationism of the Court’s case law”395. It 
is also symptomatic of what can now be referred to as the Court’s tendency to play fast and 
loose with the EU’s obligations under international law, regardless of its statements to the 
contrary396 . Furthermore it should be recalled that the Court adopted a very restrictive 
interpretation of the term “binding upon”. Here, another aspect of the Court’s isolationism 
can be identified as being that of its understanding of the conceptual relationship between EU 
and international law – that is, whether to adopt a monist or dualist approach. This aspect will 
be covered in section 4Cii below. Paragraph 50 of the judgment is an example of where the 
Court uses its own terms to describe a well-known concept of international law (in this case, 
the monist approach to vertically separate legal systems) instead of resorting to the 
traditionally accepted language. Although it is not and should not be expected of a national 
court to use the terminology of, for instance, the ICJ, doing so can be a strategy to legitimise 
an argument or approach in terms of internationally accepted norms. 
This specific problem of isolationism is not so much an irreconcilable jurisprudential clash 
between norms of EU and international law, but rather an unfortunate side-effect of the 
Court’s reluctance to meet the ATA’s arguments head on. By skirting around concepts such 
as ‘jurisdiction’, ‘extra-territoriality’, ‘unilateral action’ and ‘external competence’ instead of 
submitting its analysis of the Aviation Directive to traditional understanding of these concepts 
under international law, the Court is doing the EU’s leadership effort a great disservice. As 
mentioned above, the Aviation Directive is an outstanding example of where the EU’s 
leadership efforts can pay off. As such, this author believes that the Aviation Directive 
deserved to fight off the ATA’s attack on the ATA’s terms (and, as will be demonstrated, that 
it would have won). What took place instead was a match massaged by politics and hesitance 
to guarantee the Directive’s victory in a minimalist and inoffensive manner. Because the 
Court sought to ensure the validity of the Directive in such a way, the circumstances of the 
legal battle were from the beginning eschewed in the Directive’s favour. Although the case is 
a victory from an EU perspective, the backlash witnessed in its aftermath speaks volumes to 
the international sentiment. From that perspective, the Court’s approach robbed the Aviation 
Directive of the legitimacy it may otherwise have enjoyed, and more than anything else, 
vindicated the critics’ view that the EU is neither ready nor confident enough to play by the 
common rules.  
This consequence is truly regrettable, because as the below analyses will show, had the Court 
made the hard decision to take the battle on the international stage and subject to common 
rules of international law, it would have arrived at the same conclusion. The only difference is 
that it would have been able to do so on the back of conceptually sound, as opposed to 
circumstantially expedient, legal reasoning. This reasoning would moreover have been much 
harder for other states to criticise without risking the consistency and coherence of their own 
stance under international law.  
ii.  Conceptual isolationism: monism and dualism  
This final subsection addresses one of the systemic tensions between EU and international 
law – the nature of the conceptual and consequently the practical relationship between the two 
legal systems. This is a matter that, throughout the ATAA judgment, remains as shrouded in 
uncertainty as ever. As Mayer puts it, the progressive development of legal standards, 
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encouraged and aspired for in international law, is recognized by national courts including the 
CJEU as having prevalence over national legal systems. The court, referring to Article 216(2) 
TFEU397, reiterates the accepted traditional stance398 of the superiority of international law 
over any domestic legal system399, implying (although never expressly stating400) support for 
a monist system. Yet the reasoning of the court is riddled with inconsistency regarding the 
nature of the relationship, a common characteristic in the “love-hate relationship between EU 
and international law”401.  
At the core of the inconsistency seems to be the CJEU’s disdain of international rules that are 
not ‘progressive’ in the above meaning402. Mayer writes that “Europe and the world appear to 
be on two diverging tracks, rather than simply on different positions on the same path: 
reconciling them becomes all the more difficult” 403 . This development was clearly 
demonstrated in the Kadi404 judgment, where the CJEU rejected measures to implement UN 
sanctions that contained insufficient procedural guarantees and so conflicted with European 
fundamental rights405. As stated in the comment on ‘decisional sovereignty’ (section 4C) the 
argument in the ATAA case was that in the same way, international rules prevent the EU from 
taking action to mitigate climate change. The intention of the CJEU is the same in Kadi and 
ATAA – to promote progressive EU standards over inflexible and anachronistic international 
ones. While the intention of the Court is laudable in ATAA as in Kadi, its effect on legal 
certainty and the rule of law is unfortunately much more muddled406 and detrimental from a 
leadership perspective. If others are to look to the EU for leadership, they must know that the 
same rules apply to all the players and that the EU will (or at the least, when it will) honour 
its commitments. As Mayer puts it, “possibly for reasons of political prudence, the Court 
grounded its decision on shaky legal arguments, and avoided addressing the challenges 
brought by ATA, rather than invoking Kadi-like reasons”407. The parallels between these two 
cases, and especially the missed opportunities in ATAA, will form the basis of the concluding 
section of this chapter.   
Three conceptual models can be used to describe the relationship between EU law and the 
international obligations of the Member States; ‘mutual ignorance’, i.e. EU isolationism from 
Member State obligations; ‘complete surrender’ whereby Article 351 TFEU places the EU 
institutions under an obligation to ensure Member State compliance with international law 
obligations; and ‘mutual respect’ whereby the EU institutions are under an obligation not to 
interfere with the Member States’ ability to comply with their international law obligations408.  
The ATAA case is an example of ‘mutual ignorance’. In rejecting the applicability of the 
Chicago Convention, the Court essentially stated that the EU institutions are free to ignore the 
international law obligations of the Member States (even where these bind all 27 Member 
States). Under this scenario, the CJEU is not only assuming a dualist system between EU law 
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and international law, but also between EU law and Member State law. This approach is 
clearly offensive of the rule of law, as it “reveals a failure of the project of law: its incapacity 
to provide a unique and consistent set of rules” 409. Moreover, the fully dualist approach 
constitutes a prima facie breach of EU primary law – as discussed above, Article 351 TFEU 
provides that the Treaties should not affect the rights and obligations of Member States 
arising from certain agreements including the Chicago Convention. Yet in its interpretation of 
Article 351 TFEU, the Court relied on an old and unclear interpretation of its meaning, drawn 
from an earlier case, Burgoa410, relying on a passage stating that Article 351 TFEU “does not 
bind the Community as regards the non-member country”411.  
In that case, Mr Burgoa had argued the ‘complete surrender’ model, that Article 351 TFEU 
placed the EU institutions under an obligation to ensure Member State compliance with 
international obligations412. The Court in that case stated that Article 351 TFEU did not place 
upon the EU or the Member States an obligation to respect their obligations under 
international law, and it certainly did not give rise to an obligation on the EU to ensure that 
Member States secure these. Indeed, the passage relied on by the Court in ATAA was first 
made in this context, and stated that:  
“[a]lthough the first paragraph of Article 234 [now 351 TFEU] makes mention only of 
the obligations of the Member States, it would not achieve its purpose if it did not imply 
a duty on the part of the institutions of the Community not to impede the performance of 
the obligations of Member States which stem from a prior agreement. However, that 
duty of the Community institutions is directed only to permitting the Member State 
concerned to perform its obligations under the prior agreement and does not bind the 
Community as regards the non-member country in question.”413 
In other words, in ATAA the Court uses a truncated abstract from Burgoa to achieve precisely 
the opposite of the originally intended effect. Indeed, the full statement of the Court in 
Burgoa conforms to neither of the above conceptual models, and instead forms the basis of 
the third.  
This is the ‘mutual respect’ model, positing that the EU institutions are indeed under an 
obligation (unlike the Court stated in ATAA), just not the one proposed by Mr Burgoa. Instead 
the EU institutions must ensure that they do not prevent the Member States from being able to 
comply with their obligations under international law. This meant that the EU would not be 
isolated from the international obligations of the Member States. This third model has largely 
been adopted in the case law of the Court following Burgoa. In the International Fruit case 
the Court interpreted Article 351 TFEU as meaning that “by concluding a treaty between 
them [the Member States] could not withdraw from their obligations to third countries”414. 
With regard to the Aviation Directive, this would mean firstly that the EU does not have to 
ensure that Member States comply with the Chicago Convention, nor does it have to 
incorporate the Chicago Convention in its Directives. On the other hand it would also mean 
that the Aviation Directive cannot impose obligations on the Member States that would 
prevent them from complying with the Chicago Convention415. In ATAA, the Court uses a 
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small portion of the Burgoa judgment to nullify the effect of Article 351 TFEU, and to 
contradict both the explicit provision of the Article as well as the established jurisprudence of 
the Court and in doing so “rejects arbitrarily the backbone of international air law”416.  
Mayer argues that the formalistic exclusion by the Court of the CICA in ATAA, although 
unfortunate, could have been overlooked on its own. Throughout the rest of the judgment, the 
Court in fact deals with nearly all the points argued under the CICA as part of its analysis of 
the various accepted grounds of invalidity. Article 1417 of the CICA is recognised by the 
Court in the form of the principle of sovereignty in customary international law. Article 11418 
is almost identical in its scope to a combined reading of Articles 2 and 7 of the OSA. Article 
15419 of the CICA is indirectly reviewed by the Court as part of the Article 3(4) of OSA. 
Article 24420 of the CICA bears a similar meaning to Article 11 of the OSA. The sum of all 
this is that the Court could easily have chosen the path of consistency with EU primary law, 
its own jurisprudence, as well as with the EU’s obligation to respect international law421 while 
arriving at an identical judgment that does not offend international observers. In doing so, it 
would not have sacrificed so much of the EU’s credibility as an environmental leader in the 
eyes of the international community.   
iii.  The jurisdiction argument 
This section will focus on the first ground of invalidity argued by ATA, that is, the principle 
of equal sovereignty of states, which is considered a founding pillar of international law422. 
Exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction is often seen as a form of unilateralism that is either 
detrimental to international cooperation or outright illegal under international law. It will be 
recalled that AG Kokott recognised that the Aviation Directive has an ‘extra-territorial’ 
effect, but qualified the case on the basis that the Aviation Directive does not dictate how 
foreign airlines should reduce their emission, and that as a result the important factor as far as 
international law is concerned is whether there is a sufficient link between the incident/effect 
and the state in question423. In a similar vein the Court states that it is not the aircraft that is 
subject to the EU ETS, but the operator of that flight, having chosen to conduct its flights to 
or from EU airports424.  
The Court’s choice of terminology here is another instance of semantic isolation, if not even 
unfamiliarity with the finer points of the concept of jurisdiction. Although the Court refers to 
the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case425 with regard 
to the ‘nexus’ (discussed below), it could have gone further, exploring the distinct 
applications of the concept of jurisdiction in international law. For our purposes, one can 
distinguish prescriptive jurisdiction426 from enforcement jurisdiction427. The international law 
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governing enforcement jurisdiction is clear: enforcement jurisdiction is strictly limited to the 
territory of the state itself, and may not be exercised in any other state without the consent of 
that third state. The law relating to prescriptive jurisdiction, on the other hand, is quite 
convoluted (and in many cases, undecided). Prescriptive jurisdiction may be established 
subject to various principles 428 . Two of these need to be explored here; these are the 
nationality and territoriality principles. 
The matter of the nationality principle is easily dealt with. Opponents of the Aviation 
Directive argue that airlines are subject only to the nationality principle of jurisdiction, and as 
such are under the sole regulatory jurisdiction of the home state. It has been convincingly 
shown, however, that the Schengen area passport requirements apply to all airlines and have 
been accepted without opposition by the international community429. 
The issue is more complicated with regard to the territoriality principle. It can be argued that 
a state is prevented from exercising jurisdiction over acts that are wholly internal to another 
state. Yet this does not mean that a state only has jurisdiction over matters that are wholly 
internal to itself. Instead, a nexus must be demonstrated between the regulating state and the 
activity in question per the Lotus Case. In the case of aviation, such a nexus is demonstrable 
as stated above. As such, it would be incorrect to claim that the EU is exercising extra-
territorial jurisdiction with regard to the Aviation Directive, as doing so would deny the rule 
in the Lotus case. The Court does muddle the application of its jurisdiction analysis 
somewhat, stating at paragraph 125 that the aircraft landing at EU airports are subject to the 
unlimited jurisdiction of the EU. In the following paragraphs the Court justifies how this 
translates into a non-extra-territorial application of jurisdiction and how the freedom to fly 
over the high seas is not infringed. And yet, a straightforward application of the principle of 
territorial jurisdiction under international law would have provided an entirely satisfactory 
explanation for the operation of the EU ETS under the Aviation Directive, in terms that 
would appeal to the international lawyer.  
According to customary international law, there are three distinct applications of the 
territoriality principle. These three applications are the subjective430 and objective431 forms of 
territorial jurisdiction, as well as the ‘effects’ doctrine432. The contested part of the Aviation 
Directive would fall under the objective form of territorial jurisdiction: the EU is exercising 
its prescriptive jurisdiction in a case where an incident has been completed within its territory 
(the negative impact of emissions in the form of climate change and environmental 
degradation) although it was initiated outside its territory (as the contested part of the 
emissions took place outside EU territory). This provides the ‘nexus’ referred to by the 
Court433, and would allow the Court’s interpretation to escape the ‘Lotus fallacy’, which the 
current interpretation is guilty of indulging. The Lotus fallacy is the notion that the Lotus case 
allows a state to “extend the reach of its prescriptive jurisdiction as it chooses”, or in other 
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words, in an ‘unlimited’ manner 434 . Moreover, because the aircraft is physically within 
Member State territory, the EU is free to exercise its enforcement jurisdiction. As 
demonstrated, the implications are almost identical. So why should the Court have bothered 
to go down this route instead? By referring to the “unlimited jurisdiction” of the EU, the 
Court is associating its interpretation with the Lotus fallacy, which has clear negative 
connotations for an international lawyer. Opting for an interpretation that (if only in name) 
flies in the face of accepted customary international law, when a perfectly accepted one 
would achieve the same result, is yet another instance of isolationism. Applying the objective 
form of territorial jurisdiction would give the EU an international law basis for extending its 
prescriptive territorial jurisdiction to cover the contested emissions. 
Moving on, public international law is rife with instances of not wholly-internal applications 
of jurisdiction435. For instance, WTO rules allow a state to regulate services and service-
providers from a second state where the regulating state is the destination market436. This also 
leads us to the third application of the territoriality principle; the widely-known, if 
controversial, ‘effects doctrine’ that has seen use in anti-trust cases on both sides of the 
Atlantic. First used in the Alcoa Aluminium437 case as a tool by the US to exert jurisdiction 
over a non-US company allegedly participating in a cartel that had an effect on US imports 
and exports. The doctrine then received widespread negative coverage in the press for its 
application in the Uranium Antitrust438 case, where a US provision allowing victims of cartel-
activity to claim back triple the damage cause by the cartel-members – the only jurisdictional 
link to the US thus being one of economic effect. It was widely believed that this extension of 
jurisdiction (at a time when US trade laws shut foreign uranium suppliers out of the US 
market) constituted nothing but a thinly veiled exercise of economic imperialism. Yet 
application of the effects doctrine is not limited to the US, as it was used to establish 
jurisdiction by the EU in the Wood Pulp439 case440. Furthermore, Hertogen notes that the 
taxation of worldwide incomes of ‘resident aliens’ in the US441 is not only comparable, but 
more far-reaching than the EU’s inclusion of foreign airlines in the EU ETS. The aviation 
regulation equivalent would be “the position where the EU requires all carriers that regularly 
land at an EU airport to submit allowances for all their flights, even those between two non-
EU airports” 442.  
It is worth considering that whatever justifications for the regulation of aviation emissions 
may be offered in terms of international law, alternatives to the effects doctrine are to be 
preferred. The effects doctrine carries with it considerable stigma as it has been used a tool of 
economic imperialism to be wielded by those states whose economic activities are global and 
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whose interests may thus be affected in a very broad set of circumstances – in other words, 
not a legacy that the EU’s climate change policy ought to be associated with.  
Yet it will be recalled that the Advocate General in ATAA makes comments that resemble 
closely the effects doctrine443 and the Court also ties its comments (although it did not in 
discuss in detail whether this type of effect could justify cross-border regulation444) implying 
an extra-territorial effect – that emissions by air carriers anywhere in the world affect the 
environment in EU Member States through climate change – to the above Wood Pulp case445. 
Mayer argues that while this line worked well in the Commune de Mesquer446, the other case 
cited by the Court at paragraph 129, “in the circumstances of the present case, the argument 
may be somewhat stretched”447. While a flight anywhere in the world contributes to climate 
change in the EU, the legal task of establishing a causal relation between all flights to and 
from the EU and climate change within the EU is an entirely different matter.  
Hertogen concludes that according to the principles of jurisdiction, the problem with 
regulation of aviation emissions is not that it is outside a state’s jurisdiction, but rather that it 
is within all states’ jurisdiction. This results in the risk of double-regulation, which is usually 
avoided through international agreement or the creation of international organisations with 
regulatory power. Alas, as we have seen, these approached have failed to gain traction in the 
international aviation community – the ICAO has been unable to produce an international 
agreement, and as such it has not been granted any hard regulatory powers. In the absence of 
these traditional tools, we must instead look to the best available alternatives: in this case, that 
alternative is the Aviation Directive.  
iv.  The sovereignty argument 
Hertogen suggests that a variant of the principle of sovereignty may also be applied here. This 
alternative solution is constructed around the international law concept of sovereignty, used in 
the sense of ‘decisional independence over domestic affairs’448. Decisional jurisdiction was 
first argued by Australia in the Nuclear Tests449 case, but was not addressed in the ICJ’s 
judgment, nor widely covered in the subsequent academia. It is suggested that a state’s 
decisional inviolability (in this case, the right of a state to determine how much environmental 
degradation is acceptable within the territory of the state) is a central function of the concept 
of sovereignty. By leveraging the idea of decisional independence over domestic affairs in the 
context of ‘multi-territorial activities’450 such as aviation, the concept of sovereignty can be 
used to argue that a state must have the ability to regulate activities451 carried out by foreign 
actors when these affect the domestic affairs of the ‘regulating state’452. It is important to note 
the difference between the effects doctrine and decisional jurisdiction.  While the effects 
doctrine seeks to extend jurisdiction beyond a state’s borders, decisional jurisdiction instead 
seeks to prevent restrictions on a state’s ability to decide on domestic matters. 
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This approach capitalises on the double-edged nature of the concept of sovereignty, and 
reveals how such concepts can at times be moulded to suit the argument of the relevant party. 
Here the sovereignty argument is reversed with respect to the argument submitted by the 
applicants in the ATAA case. Whereas in the ATAA case it was essentially argued that the 
Aviation Directive infringed the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states, it is 
instead posited here that a state’s sovereignty may be infringed by the lack of multilateral 
action or action by the ‘home state’453 to prevent or minimise negative spill-overs affecting 
the ‘regulating state’. In the case of the aviation dispute, the logic is that it cannot be up to the 
sole discretion of the home state whether or not airlines should pay for their negative 
externalities, such as environmental damage in the regulating state454. Allocating regulatory 
jurisdiction on the basis of decisional independence would have the added advantage of 
diminishing the incentive to free ride, which is of special concern in environmental matters as 
noted at multiple occasions above. ‘Decisional sovereignty’ only applies within the territory 
of the regulating state, and exists in relation to third states’ decision sovereignty. This means 
that decisional sovereignty is contingent on the absence of domestic regulation or multilateral 
cooperation in other countries.  
As we have seen above, the conditions of contingency are satisfied with regard to the 
Aviation Directive, as firstly, there is no multilateral agreement on aviation emissions, and 
secondly, the Aviation Directive provides derogations for states that have enacted comparable 
provisions455. As for the condition of territoriality, the argument can be made that while the 
contested emissions from aviation456 do not take place within the territory of the EU, they 
contribute to anthropogenic climate change which in turn is capable of damaging the 
environment within the EU’s territory. Thus, where the EU and the Member States see 
nothing more in the Aviation Directive than an exercise of their sovereignty, the other side 
sees an extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction. These opponents see sovereignty as the 
ultimate legal authority to decide to the exclusion of others – or what Brownlie refers to as 
“territorial sovereignty in public international law”457.  The question that remains is whether 
the Aviation Directive is a legitimate exercise of sovereignty, i.e. ‘decisional independence’.  
From the perspective of a state’s capacity to decide over its domestic affairs, is the EU’s 
action in the form of the Aviation Directive preferable to international inaction? The lack of 
regulation leads to the negative environmental effects associated with the unregulated growth 
of the aviation sector, the effects of which are naturally not localised to only those states that 
refuse to take action. This would be incompatible with the Trail Smelter Case458 which states 
that sovereignty should not be exercised in a way that causes negative environmental impacts 
in another state. Secondly, the lack of any ‘borderless’ regulatory mechanism causes 
competitive disadvantages. Although the fear of a loss of competitiveness does not 
technically prevent a state from regulating its airlines, it does make doing so a political 
impracticality, especially when considering that regulating airlines according to a strictly 
territorial approach would cause only negligibly smaller growth in emissions, and would not 
prevent the negative environmental consequences. This is one reason why the ‘last-leg’ 
principle was felt to be a necessary part of the Aviation Directive. These two consequences of 
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inaction effectively prevent the EU from regulating the airline industry in a way that would 
maintain or improve its environmental quality. Opponents of the Aviation Directive claim 
that it involves higher costs459. However, economic costs are a natural consequence of any 
economic activity, and according to the International Law Commission, are not covered by 
the ‘no harm’ principle 460 . Moreover, the ‘polluter pays’ principle from both EU and 
international law supports placing the cost of pollution with the polluter and not the victim or 
the regulator.  
It is also argued that the Aviation Directive has a negative impact on the ability of other states 
to regulate the airline industry, and that the EU has gained a ‘first mover’ advantage. 
However, the Aviation Directive clearly provides for (and even encourages) the adoption of 
similar rules by other states461, known as ‘contingent unilateralism’462. Whether this provision 
will translate in a suitable manner into practice will depend on the EU’s treatment of similar 
but not identical schemes. Too strict an approach here could open the Aviation Directive to 
criticism for failing to respect the decisional sovereignty of other states. Some guidance as to 
how it could be applied in practice can be gleaned from the Shrimp/Turtle463 case where it 
was stated that unilateral trade restricting action may be exempted from WTO rules where 
good faith attempts have been made to negotiate a bilateral or multilateral agreement464. 
Where such agreements do not materialise, a state may regulate unilaterally as long as 
regulation by other states is allowed under the scheme. In this consideration, the regulating 
state should not require other states to adopt a scheme that is ‘essentially the same’ as its 
own465. This is an example of where the environmental leadership of the EU could have been 
better maintained had the Court avoided its semantic and conceptual isolationism. “In its 
original proposal, the Commission suggested that an exemption for a non-EU country should 
be made conditional upon the adoption by it of measures which are at least equivalent to the 
requirements laid down in the Aviation Directive”466. Not only is this in clear conflict with 
the Shrimp/Turtle judgment, but could also explain why some observers are so worried about 
the Aviation Directive. Had reference been made by the CJEU to the Shrimp/Turtle case as an 
example of the type of interpretation that could be applied under the ‘equivalence provision’, 
some international observers could have been appeased. This would allow them in the future 
to refer to the ATAA judgment as a guide to any conflicts as to equivalence of schemes. As it 
stands, the good intentions behind Article 25(a) risk running into the sand. The ATAA 
judgment gives the cynical observer no reason to believe that the ‘equivalence provision’ is 
anything more than an empty promise, to be abandoned once the initial controversy over the 
implementation of the Aviation Directive has faded467.   
However, even this would have left much room for friction. On the one hand, the risk 
presented by the Shrimp/Turtle approach is that of a traditional ’race to the bottom’. If the 
initial standard is high, then entrants to the mechanism may progressively lessen the demands 
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they make with regard to domestic operators, while pointing to the nearly similar, but 
marginally more onerous, provisions of earlier entrants. On the other hand the integration 
requirement under Article 11 TFEU may arguably place the Court under an obligation to 
interpret (note that this obviously in no way affects the decision that the Court must arrive at 
– only its interpretation of the intention and purpose of the legislator behind the act) EU acts 
so as to allow only a neutral or positive net effect on environmental protection468. This would 
effectively prevent the Court from interpreting Article 25(a) of the Aviation Directive as 
allowing a Shrimp/Turtle type approach to ‘equivalent’ third country schemes, precisely 
because of the possibility that this may allow a net reduction in the level of environmental 
protection as per the above.  
The Directive also emphasises the EU’s continued support for a multilateral solution, and 
even offers the model utilised in the Aviation Directive as a possible blueprint for an 
international mechanism469. This is significant as the concept of decisional sovereignty is not 
intended as a ground for attacking multilateralism. Decisional sovereignty recognises the 
difficulty of achieving multilateral solutions to public good-problems, such as emissions 
mitigation. Rather, whereas the opposition to the Aviation Directive wishes to retain the 
incentive to free-ride under the international legal system, decisional sovereignty is designed 
to circumvent this problem. States will be encouraged to take regulatory lead as this will 
reward them in terms of experience gained, as well as allow them to shape multilateral 
regulatory regimes in directions that they find suitable. The impact on competitiveness can 
also be mitigated if not removed, while apportioning costs according to accepted principle of 
international (environmental) law. Finally, as the Shrimp/Turtle case has demonstrated, states 
will remain under a good faith obligation to negotiate multilateral solutions before resorting 
to unilateralism. Decisional sovereignty thus provides a conceptual justification that may help 
to unravel stalemates in other multilateral negotiations as well, as we have witnessed with 
regard to the action on aviation emissions that the ICAO has promised for September this 
year.   
Having considered the numerous merits of the approach based on decisional sovereignty, it 
must be noted that while it certainly appears sound in theory, there are considerable barriers 
to application in practice. Most importantly, this argument builds on a principle of jurisdiction 
that has only been argued once, and in that case it was not even addressed by the ICJ. As with 
many proposed solutions, decisional sovereignty poses an almost utopian means of 
circumventing international political impotence. Alas, this would require a show of force on 
the part of states or a respected court that is and will likely remain out of reach for some time. 
That in turn would require the type of transformational and ‘heroic’ leadership not 
traditionally associated with the international community. 
v.  The free trade argument 
The CJEU stands accused of another “semantic dodge”470 with regard to its treatment of the 
ATA’s challenge Article 11(2) Open Skies Agreement. ATA argued that the EU ETS 
amounted to a ‘tax, levy, duty, fee or charge’ on ‘fuel, lubricants, and consumable technical 
supplies’ prevented by the above provision. The Court found that the Open Skies Agreement 
sought to prevent three characteristics of ‘charges’: 1) they should be based on the fuel 
                                                   
468 Refer to section 2Bii and see Jacobs (2006), supra note 168. 
469 Aviation Directive, Preamble paragraph 17.   
470 Havel B.F. and Mulligan J.Q., ‘The triumph of politics: Reflections on the judgment of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union validating the inclusion of non-EU airlines in the emissions trading scheme’ (2012) Air and 
Space Law37, 3, at 12–13. 
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consumption of aircraft, 2) there should be a direct and inseverable link between the amount 
of fuel consumed and the price to be paid by the operator, and 3) they should be intended to 
create revenue for the responsible government471.  
The Court argues firstly that the amount of allowances to be surrendered is calculated on the 
basis of both an emission factor and the amount of fuel consumed. Further it argues that the 
actual cost will vary depending on the allocation of free allowances472. As to the third point, 
the Aviation Directive provides that Member States must apply the revenue from the scheme 
in climate-change related activities. This leads the Court to conclude that the EU ETS 
“constitutes a market-based measure and not a duty, tax fee or charge on the fuel load”473. 
The second and third conditions stipulated by the Court have no basis in the OSA, which 
intentionally defines the charges referred to in negative terms in order to achieve broader 
coverage. It is difficult to argue that the EU ETS escapes the phrasing of the OSA, which 
explains why the Court felt the need to change the phrasing. Furthermore Article 15 of the 
CICA is imported into the ATA’s argument through Article 3(4) OSA. Article 15 of the 
CICA expands the meaning of ‘charges etc’ beyond that employed in Article 11 OSA by 
adding the term “dues” to the others. Mayer points out that even if we allow for the Court’s 
mistaken reading of Article 11 OSA, the inclusion of “dues” simply does not allow an 
interpretation of the OSA that would allow the EU ETS to escape its application 
completely474 – yet the Court does not acknowledge the difference in terminology475. 
Mayer suggests that the Court could have maintained a consistent argument had it instead 
applied an argument grounded in international law – representing another instance of the 
Court’s isolationism. The OSA as well as the CICA allow charges where the cost of a service 
is passed on to the carrier476. The Court could have argued that the EU ETS amounts to a 
compulsory service necessary to compensate for the environmental damage caused by 
emissions from aviation. This argument would also be consistent with EU primary law, the 
EU’s obligation to respect international law and agreements, and the Aviation Directive itself 
as it requires Member States to use the revenues gained through the EU ETS on climate 
change related activities477.   
vi.  Kadi I: the Aviation Directive as an exception to international law 
The parallel between the ATAA case and Kadi I has already been touched upon. It was argued 
in section 4B that not only is it within the role of the Court to protect fundamental interests of 
the EU, but that in the case of climate change mitigation and environmental policy, the Court 
should have made a stand. Kadi demonstrated that the Court has the ability and the 
willingness to stand up for progressive laws, even in the face of contradictory international 
law. The question asked in this section is: could the Court have replicated its bold defence of 
fundamental rights from Kadi in the field of environmental protection and climate change 
policy?  
                                                   
471 ATAA (Judgment), supra note 30, at paragraphs 141-143.  
472 ATAA (Judgment), ibid, at paragraph 142.  
473 ATAA (Judgment), ibid, at paragraph 147. See also Mayer (2012), supra note 82, at 1134f.  
474 Mayer (2012), ibid, at 1135. 
475 ATAA (Judgment), supra note 30, at paragraph 153.  
476 OSA Article 11(a) contains an exception for charges “based on the cost of services provided” and CICA 
Article 15 only prevents charges imposed solely for “the right of transit over or entry into or exit from its 
territory”, and thus does not cover charges based on services rendered. 
477 Mayer (2012), supra note 82, at 1135f.  
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In Kadi the Court stated that “if the conditions for application have been satisfied”, Article 
351 TFEU “may in no circumstances permit a challenge to the principles that form part of the 
very foundations of the Community legal order, one of which is the protection of fundamental 
rights” 478 . Unlike in ATAA – where the Court engaged in hair-splitting analyses over 
language, going as far as inventing conditions for terms like ‘charge’ where none were 
stipulated, and angered international observes by excluding important international treaties 
from applying to the EU – the Court in Kadi conceded that some norms of EU law are simply 
too fundamental to capitulate, even in the face of international law. Kadi represents a deeper 
implementation of the Burgoa model of mutual respect between the two legal systems. Such a 
relationship would build on a progressive discourse between the parties intended to improve 
the quality of international legal standards. 
It is clear that such a bold approach comes at a cost. Indeed, it offends many of the sources of 
consistency previously elevated in this thesis: it sacrifices some legal certainty as well as the 
EU’s primary law obligations to respect international law and interferes with the ability of 
Member States to comply with their international obligations. These drawbacks must be 
balanced with the benefits of a truly consistent interpretation of EU law – one consisting of a 
constitutional foundation of norms that the EU will not surrender to poorly reasoned 
international law that itself offends the rule of law. It can be argued that the Kadi approach 
instils a different sense of legal certainty, where the EU stands uncompromisingly for a 
fundamental set of progressive rights and rules, designed to improve conditions for all 
humanity. This would indeed set the EU apart as a transformational and heroic leader, 
unafraid to change the rules of the game where necessary.  
In the end, between the semantic and conceptual isolationism demonstrated in ATAA, the 
Court has in any case managed to cover all the negative consequences (and then some) of a 
Kadi-like approach, without achieving any of the benefits. Extending the Kadi analysis to the 
Aviation Directive could moreover have been achieved in one of two ways. Firstly, it could 
be argued on the basis of the preamble479 to Aviation Directive and in the context of the EU’s 
environmental competence (especially Articles 3(3) and 3(5) TEU and 191(1) TFEU) that it 
aims to implement the ‘high level of environmental protection’ contained in Article 37 
CFREU, and consequently it is not a new exception, but an extension of the protection of 
fundamental rights already covered by Kadi. Mayer notes that such a  
“judgment may certainly be understood in the context of a jurisdictional policy. Constitutional 
arguments may have annoyed third States governments and nourished the depiction of the EU as 
an arrogant legal fortress […] a constitutional derogation denotes a stronger political posture 
than a would-be unfortunate ‘technical’ judgment. In both cases however, the Court takes a 
distant posture toward international law. Such a distant posture would have been more 
acceptable politically and less detrimental to the development of international law had it been 
based on a well-justified constitutional exception, rather than on the mere rejection of the 
Chicago Convention following a truncated reference to old case law and an arbitrary 
interpretation of EU primary law.”480 
If compliance with the EU’s obligations under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol cannot 
justify a constitutional exception, then what value are we to assign to international treaties 
and to the corpus of law they represent?  
                                                   
478 Kadi, supra note 291, at paragraphs 301 and 304.  
479 Aviation Directive, Recital 9.  
480 Mayer (2012), supra note 82, at 1137. 
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With respect to the UNFCCC in particular, Mayer suggests a second argument based not on 
‘constitutional exceptionalism’, but the supremacy of one international agreement over 
another. International law could conceivably be used to justify a derogation from international 
aviation law (that is, the CICA) in regards to the Aviation Directive on the basis of developed 
States’ duty to take the lead on climate change mitigation (that is, the CBDR principle under 
the UNFCCC481). The Court could have pointed to Article 3(3) UNFCCC as empowering 
parties to take precautionary action to prevent climate change482 in a case like the Aviation 
Directive. The Law of Treaties could furthermore be used to argue the weight and importance 
of the UNFCCC relative to the CICA; the UNFCCC is more recent than the CICA, is ratified 
by five more states, and the Aviation Directive would not significantly impact the objectives 
of the CICA whilst the primary purpose of the Directive is to achieve the goals set by the 
Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. The Court could thus have made the argument in a way that 
is consistent with international law as well as EU law, but politically riskier. Then again, Kadi 
has shown us that such leadership is not beyond the Court’s considerable capacity – the EU 
could demonstrate genuine environmental leadership by fully embracing environmental 
protection as a fundamental aspect of EU law. This would allow it to extend Kadi-like 
reasoning to the central feature of its environment policy – its action on climate change. In 
this way, the Aviation Directive could have provided an ideal foundation for establishing a 
precedent. That precedent is that the European Union will respect international law and 
honour its responsibilities thereunder. However, so long as the international community fails 
to agree to a ‘sufficiently rigorous doctrine of climate change mitigation and environmental 
protection’, those very laws and responsibilities also obligate the EU as an internationally 
responsible actor, to assume the duties of leadership where none other is willing and able to 
do so.  
  
                                                   
481 UNFCCC, Article 3(1). 
482 See the principle of precautionary action in EU law in Article 191(2) TFEU. See also Aviation Directive, 
Preamble paragraph 19 stating that the Directive is based on the precautionary principle.  
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5 Conclusion 
Where the regulation of aviation emissions is concerned, one thing is certain; the story is not 
over. Much of what has been said in this thesis corroborates such a hypothesis. Indeed, seen 
from the perspective of the global fight against climate change, the aim of this thesis has been 
to answer questions surrounding the future and development of climate change action. It has 
sought to outline the legal and political background to what has become an international 
dispute of no small proportion. It has placed much focus on the claim of one particular 
regional actor to environmental leadership, motivating the choice on the basis of the EU’s 
willingness to take initiative as well as responsibility not only in its own interests, but for a 
cause that affects and will continue to affect all of mankind. As the EU ETS forms the 
centrepiece of the EU’s climate change policy (and its climate change policy forms the 
centrepiece of its environmental action), so it also features at the centre of this thesis. As the 
latest development in the expansion of the EU ETS, the Aviation Directive plays a crucial 
role in advancing the EU’s environmental ambitions. The passage of the Directive has met 
resistance from industry as well as third states, and now tests the maturity of the EU’s 
environmental leadership. The key to passing this test lies in the common resolve of the 
Member States of the EU and its institutions to see the Aviation Directive through. This thesis 
has focused on what the author believes could be the ‘weak link’ in this chain – the Court of 
Justice. More precisely, what is at issue is the Court’s particular interpretation of various 
aspects of law in the instance of the ATA legal action against the Aviation Directive.  
In Chapter II an overview of the EU ETS demonstrated its importance in the EU’s climate 
change policy, and as result, in its action on environmental protection as a whole. In short, the 
EU ETS is the flagship project in the EU’s environmental protection arsenal, and thus a large 
share of current efforts to combat climate change depend on its success. Chapter II went on to 
discuss some of the problems encountered in the early stages of the scheme, many of which 
persist to date; that the price per tonne of CO2 emissions in the EU ETS remains around the 
€3.50 mark483 is symptomatic of this. On top of this, the EU ETS has recently entered a 
crucial phase of expansion, the first step of which consists of the Aviation Directive. The 
need for resolve on environmental policy within the EU is greater than ever. Thus the case of 
aviation emissions is a clear test to the future of the EU’s climate change (and thus 
environmental protection) action.  The statistics on sectoral emission growth discussed in this 
thesis argue that if the Aviation Directive fails to take off the ground, the EU ETS will be 
severely handicapped and its ability to effectively curb EU-emissions fatally undermined.  
In its review of the EU’s legal competences, Chapter II demonstrated that EU law grants the 
legislature and executive broad environmental competences, but also places them under 
certain responsibilities and obligations to international law, and the international community. 
Although these two features of EU law may at times appear in tension with each other, it can 
also be argued that they may redeem one another. It has been argued in this thesis that the 
Aviation Directive in particular is an extraordinary example of how the EU’s environmental 
leadership abilities and qualities can be used to drive and encourage a higher level of 
international environmental protection in a responsible way. Chapter II argued that the 
Aviation Directive strikes a balance between the two features of EU law: it reflects the full 
extent of the EU’s internal competences so as to achieve a progressive and high-quality 
                                                   
483 European Energy Exchange, ‘EU Emissions Allowances – Primary Market Auction’. Available at: 
http://www.eex.com/en/Market%20Data/Trading%20Data/Emission%20Rights/EU%20Emission%20Allowance
s%20%7C%20Spot. Accessed 21 March 2013. 
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instrument. The Aviation Directive does this in a way that also fulfils the EU’s 
responsibilities to the international community and respects international agreements and the 
international environmental framework. As a result, it is clear that the Aviation Directive is 
implemented in accordance with the law of the EU. Chapter II demonstrated that as a matter 
of law, the EU is indeed well placed to take on the role of environmental leader. The EU has 
the requisite competence to be a strong leader, but its competences are also bound by 
constitutional restrictions contained in the Treaties – specifically obligations to and under 
international law. These seemingly competing qualities, when combined, create a harmony 
between national, regional and international law and policy unmatched by other legal systems 
– and so create a foundation for multilateral cooperation.    
Chapter III examined the role of the Court and its judicial interpretation in supporting the 
EU’s ambitions in climate change leadership. It concluded that it is in no way beyond the 
mandate or capacity of the CJEU to act as a constitutional court, to support lawfully 
implemented policies aimed at achieving the objectives of the Treaties. Chapter III offered a 
review of some of the Court’s seminal constitutional moments and drew a parallel between 
the development of the Court’s jurisprudence on fundamental rights and on environmental 
protection. It suggested that it may be time for the latter to receive the constitutional treatment 
given by the Court to the former in 2008 in Kadi. In light of the Court’s jurisprudence, it is 
not a stretch to say that not only is it the Court’s responsibility to support the lawful policies 
of the EU, but that it should in fact do so in the way that is most conducive to advancing these 
policies aimed at fulfilling the objectives of the Treaties. With regard to the Aviation 
Directive, the EU is seeking to achieve the objective of, inter alia, a high level of 
environmental protection by establishing itself as an environmental leader and role model. In 
this way, the author feels justified in proposing alternatives that may have better supported 
the EU’s leadership ambitions.  
Chapter IV turned its attention to the legal arguments surrounding the Aviation Directive. It 
found that the CJEU’s interpretation of the ATA’s arguments sells the EU’s environmental 
capabilities short, and may have fuelled international observers’ impressions of the EU as ‘an 
arrogant legal fortress’ that believes itself to stand above international law. This in turn 
contributed to the severe backlash of the international community against the perceived high-
handedness of the EU. The magnitude and uniformity of the international response, 
reinforced by domestic calls to abandon the Aviation Directive, caught some EU actors off 
guard. The aftermath to the ATAA case has revealed schisms in the EU’s environmental 
politics and resolve on controversial issues. As a result, the EU has given in to pressure; in a 
move that may yet prove a deft political manoeuvre, the clock on the Aviation Directive was 
stopped with regard to foreign operators. Observers eagerly anticipate the result of 
September’s ICAO Council meeting – which, with a considerable dose of luck, may yet 
produce the keenly sought-after international agreement on the regulation of aviation 
emissions. More likely, however, the measure will buy both sides time to consider their next 
moves. Going forward, this thesis finds that if the EU is to be a role model and a credible 
leader, it must play to the strengths of its position and be unapologetic in its pursuit of a 
progressive and sustainable global climate change policy.  
The time between now and the meeting of the ICAO Council in September will be used by 
the opponents of the Aviation Directive to build their case against the EU’s climate change 
policy, and they will have learned their lessons from the ATAA judgment. The EU must use 
this time to prepare itself as well. This thesis has outlined what the author believes to be the 
major legal difficulties left unaddressed by the CJEU in the ATAA judgment. Although some 
are serious, most of the shortcomings highlighted here can be rectified by the EU. Before 
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September, the legislature would do well to address those shortcomings that go to the design 
of the scheme – first and foremost, the compatibility of the Aviation Directive with the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. The Commission would do well to 
offer sceptics an olive branch by clarifying how it will assess applications under the 
‘equivalence clause’ of the Aviation Directive – preferably in a way that is compatible with 
the international law standard set in the Shrimp/Turtle case. And perhaps most importantly – 
for if the Aviation Directive is to be fully implemented, then sooner or later it will be tested 
before the law – the Court must decide how it is going to deal with the increasingly urgent 
issue of environmental degradation and climate change. With a mind to the role of the Court’s 
judicial interpretation in environmental protection, this thesis proposes that in the interest of 
the EU’s leadership ambitions on climate change action, the Court should choose to address 
the issue within the environmental framework established in international law. It should do so 
on the basis of an argument rooted in either the concept of jurisdiction, the concept of 
sovereignty, or as a matter of the constitutional importance and fundamental nature of the 
issue; after all, it is not some abstract idea of the ‘Earth’ that needs ‘saving’. We do.  
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